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Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote
Armand Derfner*
Lawyers in voting discrimination cases are fond of quoting Justice
Frankfurter's dictum that "the [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophis-
ticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." ' Unfortun-
ately for historical accuracy and for the health of our society, this
statement simply has been false for most of the century since the passage
of that amendment.
In the past fifteen years, however, a change has begun, and the right
to vote without discrimination has gained substance. This Article is an
effort to describe today's law of voting discrimination, and how that law
developed. Because the present state of this area is so largely a product
of its tortured history, it will be necessary to begin with a history of
black enfranchisement. This history revolves chiefly about three major,
short periods of dramatic change, separated by years of generally down-
ward drift. For each of these periods, this Article will examine the
varying response of the federal branches to the unceasing disfranchise-
ment efforts of the states.
The first period, 1867 to 1876, covers the decade of congressional
Reconstruction, which opened with formal enfranchisement of blacks
and the passage and vigorous enforcement of broad protective legisla-
tion. It ended with Supreme Court decisions gutting both the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments on the same day followed soon by a political
decision to terminate already dwindling enforcement efforts. For the
next few years the states were increasingly left to their own devices and
gradually pushed blacks effectively out of politics. Although federal
enforcement of voting rights was meager, there was one development
during these years-the Supreme Court's recognition of extensive con-
gressional power over federal elections-that was to play a large role
in the enfranchisement efforts of the 1960's.
* Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1960, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1963, Yale University.
The author has been involved as counsel for a party or amicus curiae in a number of the cases
described in this Article, including the following still-pending cases:
City of Richmond v. United States, Civil No. 1718-72 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 25, 1972); City of
Petersburg v. United States, Civil No. 509-72 (D.D.C., Oct. 24, 1972); Stevenson v. West, Civil
No. 72-45 (D.S.C., Apr. 7, 1972); Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Harper
v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 1607-72 (D.D.C., Aug. 11, 1972); Perkins v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 1309-
72 (D.D.C., Nov. 2, 1972).
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The second major period, 1890 to 1908, saw the Southern States
abandon their ad hoc barriers to black voting and develop total disfran-
chisement schemes, complete with literary tests, poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, and white primaries. Contemporaneously, the federal govern-
ment and courts clearly indicated that they would not intervene to halt
this regressive trend. This disfranchisement pattern was enormously
successful and prevailed for over half a century. In the 1940's, however,
there were faint suggestions, amplified in the 1950's, that the federal
government again would seek to enforce equal voting rights and that the
courts might be less parsimonious in their readings of the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments.
The third major period began in 1957 and has continued to the
present. During this period the fight for voting rights became a part of
the civil rights revolution, and all levels of the federal government func-
tioned to protect, not prevent, voting equality. Older responses to voting
discrimination were adapted or discarded as the situation required, and
for the first time, it seemed that full voting equality might some day be
realized.
In the modern period, for the first time since the end of Reconstruc-
tion, voting discrimination has been energetically challenged. The
growth of black political participation and power since 1957 has been
great, and with that growth has come a steady shift in the nature of the
discriminatory barriers facing black voters. For years, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter notwithstanding, the most simple-minded modes of dis-
crimination-generally transparent devices to prevent blacks from even
qualifying to vote-were almost totally effective. In the past few years,
however, the more facile of these techniques have been routed. Oppo-
nents of black political participation therefore have been forced to resort
to more sophisticated modes of discrimination, chiefly those involving
subtle burdens that deter participation and diluting mechanisms that
limit the effectiveness of black votes.
These new modes of discrimination have been met by the develop-
ment of sophisticated tools capable of dealing effectively with voting
discrimination. The new tools go beyond the traditional but cumber-
some fifteenth amendment. They include statutes, such as the provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that suspend literacy tests and require
certain states to seek advance clearance from federal authorities before
making changes in their voting procedures, and include constitutional
provisions, like the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment, that have not previously been used to protect
voting rights.
The development of new weapons against discrimination has
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brought us to a watershed. If the new weapons are vigorously used and
if the federal government and the courts maintain a commitment to
equal voting rights, the possibility of ending voting discrimination is
real. The second half of this Article is a status report on the progress
of the challenge to voting discrimination, a report that summarizes both
today's modes of discrimination and the available antidotes.
I. RECONSTRUCTION AND ENFRANCHISEMENT: 1867-1876
A. Constitutional Background
Before the Civil War, blacks, whether enslaved or free, were totally
disfranchised except in six northeastern states.2 After the War, the First
Reconstruction Act of 1867 required the former rebel states to adopt
new constitutions guaranteeing universal male suffrage without regard
to race as a condition of readmission to the Union.' These constitutions
remained in effect for a generation, being eventually discarded only
when the federal government signaled its loss of interest by repealing
most of the Reconstruction laws.
The fourteenth amendment, adopted in 1868, dealt with the fran-
chise rather backhandedly, by providing that a state's representation in
Congress was to be reduced proportionately if the state barred any adult
males from the vote. The amendment also protected citizens' privileges
and immunities, and guaranteed all persons equal protection and due
process. However, these clauses, which were to become so important in
later years, had little effect on voting at their inception.'
Enfranchisement of black citizens was formally guaranteed nation-
wide when the fifteenth amendment was passed in 1870. This amend-
ment provided that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote
2. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 122, 156 (1970) (Harlan, J.). In a few states, however, blacks
had been able to vote in earlier years.
3. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. Detailed provisions governing the adoption
and ratification of these constitutions were added later in 1867 and 1868. Act of March 23, 1867,
ch, 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 Stat. 14; Act of March 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat.
41, The subsequent statutes readmitting states to the Union provided that the Reconstruction
constitutions should never be amended to disfranchise anyone whose franchise they guaranteed,
except for conviction of felony or prospective change in residence requirements. See, e.g., Act of
June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73.
These statutes were preceded by 2 others enfranchising blacks in the District of Columbia,
Act of Jan. 8, 1867, ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375, and in the territories. Act of Jan. 25, 1867, ch. 15, 14
Stat. 379.
4. The debate over the framers' original understanding of the fourteenth amendment, partic-
ularly concerning its impact on voting, has been extensive and will not be continued here. The
debaters and other sources are listed in 2 opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 122, 154-200
(Harlan, J.), 250-78 (Brennan, J.) (1970).
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shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The amend-
ment also included, as had the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments,
a clause providing that "Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."5
B. Congressional Enforcement
Promptly after the fifteenth amendment became effective on
March 30, 1870,6 Congress exercised its authority to pass appropriate
enforcement legislation by enacting the Enforcement Act in 1870,1 and,
thereafter, expanding it by amendments in 1871.8 The Enforcement Act
contained three major portions.
First, section 1 guaranteed the right to vote in all national and state
elections to all citizens without regard to race. After all other voting
provisions of the Reconstruction statutes had been repealed, this section
remained in solitary-and largely unenforceable-splendor, until it was
again augmented by enforcement machinery beginning in 1957.1
The second major portion of the Enforcement Act, sections 2-6,
designated a variety of racially discriminatory acts as federal offenses.
Sections 2 and 3 required election officials to give whites and blacks
equal opportunities to qualify to vote and nullified any prerequisite
whose performance was made impossible by official discrimination. The
use of force, bribery, threats, economic pressure, or "other unlawful
means" to interfere with or obstruct any citizen's right to be free of
racial discrimination in voting was made criminal under sections 4 and
5. Finally, section 6 barred any conspiracy to violate other portions of
the Act or to hinder any citizen's free enjoyment of any federal right or
privilege. These sections were meant to be drawn narrowly in order to
fit the contours of the fifteenth amendment and, in the case of section
6, any other provision of the Constitution that created a right or privi-
lege-specifically, the fourteenth amendment. As will be seen, the Su-
preme Court soon held that they were too broad, and struck down
sections 3, 4 and 5.
5. A history of the events surrounding the passage of the fifteenth amendment is described
in W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (1965). A different view, attributing more importance to
the framers' principles than to the Republicans' need for votes, is given by Cox & Cox, Negro
Suffrage and Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography,
33 J. SOUTHERN HIsT. 303 (1967).
6. 16 Stat. 1131.
7. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 64, 16 Stat. 140.
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 49, 16 Stat. 433.
9. Section 1 of the Enforcement Act was carried forward as REVISED STATUTES § 2004, and
is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1970).
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The third major portion of the Enforcement Act, covering sections
19-22, was based not on the fifteenth amendment but on the power of
Congress over federal elections. This portion represented a sweeping
exercise of that power which outlawed a host of voting and registration
frauds and other irregularities in federal elections. Sections 19-22 specif-
ically defined a federal election as one in which a federal officer-a
representative or delegated to Congress-was to be chosen, regardless
of whether state officers were also being selected. Congress' broad
power to supervise federal elections was thus extended to the state elec-
tion process when states conducted dual-purpose elections or used a
single registration system for all elections. Moreover, section 22 further
extended the reach of federal power by making it a federal crime for
any official-state or federal-to violate state law in a federal election.
In contrast to its efforts to enforce the fifteenth amendment, Congress'
efforts here proved successful, for the Supreme Court eventually held
explicitly that broad federal legislation could cover elections of state
officers conducted jointly with elections for federal officers.1"
The 1871 amendments to the Enforcement Act moved in another
direction by providing for federal officials to supervise federal elections
and voting registrations. These election supervisors were to be appointed
by a federal judge upon request by two citizens of any city with more
than 20,000 persons. The supervisors were directed to see that each
precinct's rolls were honest, the elections properly conducted, and its
votes tallied correctly. Other sections gave the supervisors broad powers
and protections, including the right to assistance from United States
Marshals and, in necessary situations, the power to summon a posse to
aid with difficult arrests.
C. Judicial Construction
The Enforcement Act elicited a mixed response in the lower courts.
While the federal election provisions generally fared well, the provisions
barring racial discrimination ran into more frequent judicial opposi-
tion." A significant complication was that, as criminal statutes, they
had to be strictly construed.
10. Sections 16-18 of the Enforcement Act were designed to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. The fourteenth amendment had been adopted partly to clarify the constitutional basis for
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, which rested initially on
the thirteenth amendment. Sections 16-18 implemented the fourteenth amendment by re-enacting
the 1866 Act. Among the provisions of the 1866 Act are those now codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
82, 1987-92, and 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1970).
II. The course of enforcement is described in H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL
JUSTICE 230-49 (1937); W. DAVIS, THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ACTS, STUDIES IN SOUTHERN
1973]
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In 1875 the Supreme Court finally heard appeals that tested the
construction and validity of sections 3, 4 and 6 of the 1870 Act. In
United States v. Cruikshank,12 eight men, who were part of a mob that
had dispersed and murdered a group of blacks in Louisiana, appealed
from convictions under section 6 for conspiring to hinder citizens in the
enjoyment of rights or privileges guaranteed by the federal Constitution
or laws. 13 In United States v. Reese, 4 two election judges appealed
from convictions under sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act for refusing to
receive a black man's vote. 5 The Supreme Court deliberated on both
cases for over a year and finally handed down decisions on March 27,
1876. The result was a nearly total nullification of the critical sections
of the Enforcement Act.
In Cruikshank, the Court held that each of the rights or privileges
at whose enjoyment the conspiracy allegedly was aimed was in fact not
a federal right or privilege. The Court instead found them to be rights
or privileges which were derived from the states and which the federal
government had no power to protect. Four counts specifically alleged
interference with voter rights, but the Court held that the only voting
rights that Congress had authority to protect were the right to vote in a
federal election and the right to vote free of racial discrimination. Be-
cause neither of these rights was alleged, the indictment was held not
to state an offense. Although the Court did not strike down section 6,
it construed the section so narrowly as to render it virtually useless. 6
In Reese, the Court could find no fault with the indictments and
therefore directly faced the constitutionality of sections 3 and 4. Empha-
sizing the proposition that strict construction was necessary because
these were criminal statutes, the Court noted that "the Fifteenth
HISTORY AND POLITICS 205-28 (1914); Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-1877,
28 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 202 (1962).
12. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
13. The Colfax Massacre, which gave rise to the Cruikshank case, is described in H. CUM-
MINGS & C. MCFARLAND, supra note 11, at 241-44.
14. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
15. The judges' refusal to accept the vote was based on the voter's failure to pay his poll
tax. The voter had offered to pay the tax but the collector had refused to accept the tax because
of the voter's race. These facts activated §§ 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act. Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 14, §§ 3 & 4, 16 Stat. 140. Section 3 provided that anyone who had been wrongfully prevented
on grounds of race from doing an act necessary to qualify to vote could present an appropriate
affidavit to the election judge, who was then required to receive the person's vote or be guilty of a
crime. Section 4 provided that any person who by unlawful means prevented a citizen from voting
or qualifying to vote "as aforesaid" was guilty of a crime.
16. Section 6, the criminal conspiracy statute governing civil rights violations, has remained
in the Code, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). Its scope has broadened in recent years with the expanded
definition of federal rights. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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Amendment does not confer suffrage upon anyone," but does create a
federal constitutional right that "is within the protecting power of Con-
gress-the right to be free from discrimination in voting."17 Nonethe-
less, the Court held that the sections were void because, although the
cases involved wrongful acts done on account of race, the wording of
the sections (which the Court misread) made possible, in other situa-
tions, their application to cases not based on racial discrimination.
Thus the Supreme Court, in its first exposure to the Reconstruction
statutes, had on a single day crippled the efforts of Congress to protect
the right to vote against both official and private interference. Although
the Supreme Court's holdings were seemingly technical and implied that
Congress could rectify the statutory defects, 8 the Republicans lost con-
trol of Congress in 1875 and did not regain control until near the end
of the century, when Reconstruction was long since dead. Meanwhile,
the Supreme Court continued its series of restrictive holdings, which
within a decade virtually nullified the Reconstruction statutes. 19
17. In a powerful dissent, Justice Hunt argued that § 3 and 4 of the Enforcement Act were
limited to violations on account of race because their language tied them to § 1, which affirmed
the right to vote free of racial discrimination, and to § 2, which made it a violation for any official
to deny, on grounds of race, equal opportunity to complete the prerequisites for qualifying to vote.
"By the words 'as aforesaid,' the provisions respecting race and color of the first and second
sections of the statute are incorporated into and made a part of the third and fourth sections." 92
U.S. at 242 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
18. It has been argued persuasively that the Reese Court recognized the breadth of congres-
sional power under the fifteenth amendment, and would have upheld and enforced a broad statute,
including prohibitions against private abridgement of the right to vote, if it had been limited to
racially grounded wrongdoing. Note, The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth
Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448 (1965). Under this view, the Supreme Court remained sympathetic
to expansive congressional power under the fifteenth amendment (but not the fourteenth) through
the 1880's, and a later Court's holding that the fifteenth amendment does not extend to private
conduct was a gross misreading of Reese. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). See notes 19 &
33 infra.
19. In addition to Reese, which struck down statutory provisions on the ground that they
could be construed to reach misconduct not based on race, several other cases struck down civil
rights statutes that could be construed to reach private misconduct unaided by state action. Baldwin
v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883). The restrictive interpretation of the Reconstruction statutes and Civil War
Amendments already had begun with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873),
and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875), both of which narrowed the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903), the Supreme Court struck down § 5 of the
Enforcement Act on the ground that it covered private conduct, which the Court held was not
within the power given Congress under § 2 of the fifteenth amendment. That section barred
bribery or other interference with the right to vote of any person "to whom the right of suffrage is
secured or guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." The
holding of James was possible only because the Supreme Court (a) confused the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendment cases, (b) misrepresented the holding and language of Reese, and (c) totally
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D. End of Reconstruction
Throughout Reconstruction, strong federal enforcement of the civil
rights laws was essential to protect black voters from official fraud and
malfeasance and private violence. Although many blacks held local and
statewide office, 0 and many state governments were nominally in the
hands of "radical" governors, these were unstable governments which
depended upon the presence of federal troops and the widespread dis-
franchisement of whites .2 Society, however, remained basically under
white control, and the weight of social and economic pressure still oper-
ated to place conservative whites in power in most places-as private
citizens, if not as officials.
The first three years of the decade saw vigorous enforcement of the
new laws. In 1873, the number of criminal prosecutions in the South
under the Reconstruction statutes totaled 1,271,22 and that year's appro-
priation for administering the election supervisor program under the
1871 Act was 3,200,000 dollars. 3 Thereafter, federal enforcement
waned, and effective disfranchisement began in earnest. The reconstruc-
tion governments, though headed by "Radical Republicans," came
under increasing pressure when whites resumed voting in increased num-
bers and sought by any means to eliminate black voters. Federal troops
became less and less responsive to Republican governors' requests for
support and protection, leaving those governments vulnerable to over-
throw. When Mississippi's Republican governor, Adelbert Ames, was
forced to resign in 1875,24 only three states remained "unredeemed"-
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida-the only three states in
which federal troops were still stationed.25
These three states were to be the focus of the Hayes-Tilden Presi-
dential contest, whose settlement in the Compromise of 1877 is viewed
ignored the alternate holding of Ex parte Yarbrough, which sanctioned federal protection of the
right to be free of racial discrimination in voting. Note, supra note 18, at 1455.
Fortunately, the vitality of James as a bar to congressional protection of fifteenth amendment
rights against private conduct has apparently ended. See note 257 infra.
20. There were 20 blacks who served in the House of Representatives and 2 blacks who were
elected to the Senate during Reconstruction. J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 317-23
(3d ed. 1967).
21. Section 5 of the First Reconstruction Act, Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat.
428, provided that "participation in the rebellion" brought disfranchisement. This was construed
to include all officeholders and soldiers except conscripts.
22. M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 8 (1967).
23. Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 415, 17 Stat. 348.
24. The end of Governor Ames' tenure is described in V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN
Mississippi 1865-1890, at 181-98 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1965).
25. J. FRANKLIN, supra note 20, at 332.
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generally as the formal end of Reconstruction."8 By that Compromise,
Hayes was awarded the disputed votes of the three "unredeemed"
states, which were sufficient to elect him President. In return, federal
troops were removed from those states, and it was tacitly understood
that the federal effort to enforce black equality in the South had ended.
There were periodic federal prosecutions in the South thereafter, and the
Enforcement Act remained on the statute books until 1894, but Recon-
struction was over.
E. Congressional Power over Federal Elections
Several of the prosecutions during the twilight of Reconstruction,
however, were to have enormous significance in the twentieth cen-
tury-prosecutions for violations of the Enforcement Act in connection
with federal elections.
These cases involved Congress' specific power over election of
United States Senators and Representatives, given in article 1, section
4 of the Constitution: "The Times, Manner and Places of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of choosing
Senators." This provision formed the basis of several sections of the
Enforcement Act27 that broadly regulated the election of Representa-
tives.
After the 1876 Cruikshank and Reese decisions had narrowed or
invalidated portions of the Enforcement Act based on the fifteenth
amendment, several prosecutions for violations of the federal election
sections of the Act reached the Supreme Court and resulted in far-
reaching affirmations of Congress' article 1 power.
The first case, in 1880, was Ex parte Siebold, 8 which did not in-
volve race but ballot stuffing. Five men in Maryland were indicted for
violating section 22 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which made it a
federal crime for an election official to violate state law at a federal
election, and section 10 of the 1871 amendments to the Enforcement
Act, which made it a crime to interfere with a federal election supervi-
sor's efforts to assure an honest election. 21 In upholding these broad
26. The most complete discussion of the Compromise of 1877 appears in C. WOODWARD,
REUNION & REACTION (1966).
27. Sections 19-22 of the 1870 Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, and all but one section of the 1871
Amendments, Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 49, 16 Stat. 433.
28. 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
29. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 22, 16 Stat. 145; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 10, 16
Stat. 436.
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provisions, the Supreme Court viewed the federal power over election
of federal officers expansively to mean that if the overlapping of federal
and state functions or the concurrence of state and federal elections
created conflict, state, not federal law, must yield.
The breadth of federal power over the election of federal officers
was confirmed in 1884, in Ex parte Yarbrough." In this case, the
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of white conspirators who were
charged with having beaten a black man for voting in a federal elec-
tion-a violation of both section 6 of the Enforcement Act, which pro-
hibits interference with the exercise of a federal right or privilege3l and
section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which prohibits interference
with the specific federal right to support a candidate for federal office.
32
In upholding the constitutionality of these statutes, the Court empha-
sized Congress' broad power to deal with the election of federal officers
and to protect citizens' right to vote in such elections; and held that thus
the power extends clearly to protection against private conduct. Moreo-
ver, the Court specifically denied the applicability of fourteenth amend-
ment cases-meaning principally Cruikshank, which was not cited by
name-which had held private conduct beyond Congress' reach.
33
30. 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
31. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 14, § 6, 16 Stat. 140.
32. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, was passed to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and was necessitated by the states' inability to protect civil rights against private
interference. The Act had provisions directed at private lawlessness and rebellion, as well as a
provision guaranteeing federal rights against deprivations under color of law (now 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) and by private conspiracy (now 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970)). In Collins v.
Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1950), the Supreme Court avoided what it saw as constitutional
objections by limiting § 1985 to conspiracies involving some state action; but the Court later
removed this limitation in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96 (1971).
33. Both counts of the indictment in Yarbrough alleged that the conspirators had interfered
with the black voter's right to vote in a federal election "on account of his race, color and previous
condition of servitude." The last portion of the opinion, 110 U.S. at 664-66, discusses Congress'
power to protect fifteenth amendment rights and seems to rely on that power to derive a congres-
sional ability to protect the right to vote in federal elections:
"In the case of U.S. v. Reese, so much relied on by counsel, this court said in regard to the
Fifteenth Amendment, that 'it has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitu-
tional right which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is an exemption from
discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude.' This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of African
descent. The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of this right is within the power
of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, and to
the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against discrimination.
..The exercise of the right in both instances is guaranteed by the Constitution, and should be
kept free and pure by congressional enactments whenever that is necessary." Id. at 665.
Because Yarbrough arose on a writ of habeas corpus, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to
determining whether the statutes involved were constitutional, and did not extend to the sufficiency
of the indictments. In relation to the validity of the statutes, the discussion of Congress' power to
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Because most states used a single system for registering or other-
wise qualifying to vote for state and federal officers,34 and because these
officers often were chosen at the same elections, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Congress' power in Siebold and Yarbrough gave the
federal government a potent weapon for protecting voting rights in
general. Although the development proved abortive because most of the
Enforcement Act was repealed in 1894 and 1909, 31 the seeds were
planted for the future. Enough remained of the Enforcement Act to
sustain a tortuous line of twentieth-century cases that extended federal
law to cover various types of fraud and ballot stuffing in federal elec-
tions, and to define federal elections to include primary elections for
federal officers .3 The holding that federal elections included primaries
led directly to the outlawing of white primaries, and the recognition of
general congressional power over federal elections allowed Congress to
enact voting legislation in 1957, 1960 and 1964 that would withstand
constitutional attacks.
F. Post-Reconstruction Decline
Meanwhile, the withdrawal of the federal government from the
business of protecting voting rights yielded predictable results. From
1876 to 1890, Democrats solidified their hold in the Southern States,
and went far toward eliminating black voters as factors in politics. This
process was slowed only somewhat by the restraints of the Reconstruc-
enforce the fifteenth amendment appears to be dictum-although the federal right protected by
R.S. § 5508 in that case could as well be the right of exemption from racial discrimination in
voting as the right to vote in a federal election. In any event, whether the discussion of Congress'
power to protect fifteenth amendment rights against private action is dictum or alternate holding,
it is clear that the Yarbrough Court was convinced that such power does exist. See Note, supra
note 18.
Yarbrough was followed by several other cases in which the Supreme Court vigorously pro-
tected federal rights-chiefly those implied by the very existence of a national government-in
contrast to its grudging treatment of those rights created by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments. See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (involving the lynching of a
federal prisoner, in which the Court summarizes a number of its earlier opinions on the power of
Congress to enforce various types of federal rights).
34. In 1878, South Carolina adopted a law that provided for different ballot boxes for federal
and state elections in order to avoid federal authority over state elections. G. TINDALL, SOUTH
CAROLINA NEGROES, 1877-1900, at 31 n.67 (LSU Press ed. 1966). However, it remained generally
more convenient to continue the custom of overlapping state and federal election processes. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (passed to avoid running separate elections after the Supreme Court
upheld an 18-year-old vote law for federal elections but struck it down as applied to state elections
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
35. Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat.
1088.
36. See pages 542-44 infra.
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tion Act constitutions, which guaranteed adult male suffrage without
regard to race. Widespread use of violence, fraud and corruption kept
registered black voters away from the polls, except when there were
struggles between different white factions, in which case black votes
were often wanted and were delivered by bribery or coercion.
3 1
Another major tactic, which was equally significant, especially
from an historical perspective, has received less notice: the use of meth-
ods for diluting black votes very similar to methods used today.38 The
most common were gerrymandering and malapportionment. Missis-
sippi, for example, followed the pattern of drawing countywide legisla-
tive districts in white majority areas while in heavily black Adams and
Hinds Counties, the cities of Natchez and Jackson, which had large
concentrations of whites, were carved out as separate districts. In Vir-
ginia, the legislature reapportioned five times in thirteen years after
Redemption-in 1871, 1874, 1876, 1878 and 1883. In various states,
control over governmental functions was removed from the local gov-
ernments-many of which were still in the hands of Republican-black
alliances-and placed in the hands of the by-then Democratic state
governments.
One of the favored techniques was to make the election process
itself more difficult. In 1882, South Carolina enacted the "Eight Box
Law," under which separate ballot boxes were set up for each elective
office. For the vote to count, the voter had to cast his ballot in the proper
box; whites were assisted, but blacks were not. In other situations, ad
hoc strategies were devised: polling places were located far from black
communities, or were suddenly moved without notice; additional black
candidates were induced to run for a given office or were simply added
to the list of candidates to insure that black voters would split their votes
while whites united behind a single candidate.
37. V. WHARTON, supra note 24, at 204-05. For the general history of these years see J.
FRANKLIN, supra note 20, at 324-38; C. WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913,
1-106 (1951). For a national perspective see R. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 23-87
(Collier ed. 1965).
38. Methods used in the 1870's and 1880's to minimize or dilute the votes of blacks are
discussed in the following sources: J. FRANKLIN, supra note 20, at 332-34; A. KIRWAN, REVOLT
OF THE REDNECKS 4-5, 36-37 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1965); P. LEwINSON, RACE, CLASS, & PARTY
63-68 (Universal Library ed. 1965); W. MABRY, THE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS SINCE
RECONSTRUCTION 16-22 (1940); R. MORTON, THE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA POLITICS, 1865-1902, at
91-94 (1919); G. TINDALL, supra note 34, at 31, 39, 68-73; C. WOODWARD, supra note 37, at 54-
57; V. WHARTON, supra note 24, at 168, 199-204; C. WYNES, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA, 1870-
1902, at 7-14, 39-41 (1961); Graves, Negro Disfranchisement in Arkansas, 26 ARK. HIST. Q. 199,
208-14 (1967); Mabry, Negro Suffrage and Fusion Rule in North Carolina, 12 N.C. HIST. REV.
79, 80-81 (1935); Wardlaw, Negro Suffrage in Georgia 1867-1930, 33 BULL. U. GA., No. 22, at
34-55 (Phelps-Stokes Studies No. 11, 1932).
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Finally, there was growing use of difficult-to-meet qualifications,
which would later form the backbone of the total disfranchising
schemes. These included literacy tests, poll taxes that had to be paid well
in advance-sometimes several years-of the election, and arbitrary
residence requirements aimed at highly migratory blacks. Overall, the
voting process-for blacks-became a steeplechase.
II. TOTAL DISFRANCHISEMENT: 1890-1908
By about 1890, the halfway measures of the previous twenty years
were no longer satisfactory to whites who sought to eliminate black
political effectiveness. While blacks remained on the rolls and were
entitled to vote, there was the possibility that they might effectively
exercise their franchise, or that the federal government might again seek
to enforce their right to vote. 9 Also many blacks actually did vote, and
their votes were courted by competing white factions, thus giving blacks
an opportunity to gain by, and at the expense of, divisions among
whites. 0 Moreover, the various methods developed to keep blacks away
from the polls or to control their votes through bribery or coercion had
created a general atmosphere of corruption surrounding southern elec-
tions, causing many whites to feel that eliminating the possibility of
black voting would reduce the fraud, corruption and violence that had
been necessary to maintain white control." Finally, total disfranchise-
ment of blacks fit within the general movement to create a system of
39. In 1890, Senator Lodge introduced a bill for federal supervision of federal elections going
well beyond the 1871 amendments to the Enforcement Act, H.R. 11045, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1890). The Lodge Bill, which Southerners adroitly nicknamed the "Force Bill," passed the House
and may have had some influence in making white Mississippians believe that the Republicans,
having gained control of the Presidency and both houses of Congress for the first time since the
Grant administration, might undo the Compromise of 1877. A. KIRWAN, supra note 38, at 59. This
Bill's course through Congress is traced in R. LOGAN, supra note 37, at 70-82.
40. P. LEWINSON, supra note 38, at 88-91; G. TINDALL, supra note 34, at 75, 91; V. WHAR-
TON, supra note 24, at 203-06.
41. An historian sympathetic to disfranchisement stated that "there was a general feeling in
the North as well as in the South, that if the negro was to be excluded from his privileges in any
case, it would be better for all concerned to have it done legally than illegally." W. SMITH, NEGRO
SUFFRAGE IN THE SOUTH, STUDIES IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITics 231, 242 (1914). Judge
J.J. Chrisman, a delegate to the 1890 Mississippi Convention, put it more bluntly:
"Sir, it is no secret that there has not been a full vote and a fair count in Mississippi since
1875-that we have been preserving the ascendancy of the white people by revolutionary methods.
In plain words, we have been stuffing ballot-boxes, committing perjury and here and there in the
State carrying the elections by fraud and violence until the whole machinery for election was about
to rot down. No one would deliberately choose to perpetuate such methods . . . who was not a
moral idiot." Quoted in C. WOODWARD, supra note 37, at 57-58.
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rigid racial segregation.42 All these factors were intensified by the crisis
over populism.43
A. State Disfranchising Constitutions
The institutionalization of effective disfranchisement necessitated
amendment of the state Reconstruction constitutions." Mississippi initi-
ated this movement by holding a constitutional convention in 1890.
Because the fifteenth amendment prevented simple methods of disfran-
chisement, the convention developed a sophisticated scheme-the so-
called "Mississippi Solution" 45-which was in essence adopted by the
other southern states over the next eighteen years.4"
The Mississippi Solution was described by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in the 1896 case of Ratliff v. Beale:
Within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the federal
constitution, the convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise
of the franchise by the negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude
and dependence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit,
of temperament, and of character, which clearly distinguished it as a race from that
of the whites-a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and migratory within
narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal members given rather to fur-
tive offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal
constitution from discriminating against the negro race, the convention discrimi-
nated against its characteristics and the offenses to which its weaker members were
prone. A voter who should move out of his election precinct, though only to an
adjoining farm, was declared ineligible until his new residence should have contin-
ued for a year. Payment of taxes for two years at or before a date fixed many
months anterior to an election is another requirement, and one well calculated to
disqualify the careless. Burglary, theft, arson, and obtaining money under false
pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while robbery and murder and other
crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were not.
47
42. C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
43. V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITics 7-8, 541 (Vintage ed. 1949). In North Carolina, for exam-
ple, blacks, Populists and Republicans formed an alliance that actually governed the state from
1894 to 1898. Mabry, White Supremacy and the North Carolina Suffrage Amendment, 13 N.C.
HIST. REV. 1, 10-12 (1936); Mabry, supra note 38, at 81-95.
44. See note 3 supra.
45. A. KIRWAN, supra note 38, at 65-84; V. WHARTON, supra note 24, at 206-15.
46. The relevant dates for other conventions are: South Carolina, 1895; Louisiana, 1898;
North Carolina, 1900; Alabama, 1901; Virginia, 1902; Texas, 1902; Georgia, 1908.
The tenor of the conventions was clear, and comments can be found in virtually each one that
are the equivalent of future Senator Carter Glass' comment during the Virginia Convention:
"Discrimination! Why that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this convention
was elected for-to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the limitations
of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every Negro voter who can be gotten
rid of, legally, without materially impairing the numerical strength of the white electorate . . ..
It is a fine discrimination, indeed, that we have practiced in the fabrication of this plan." P.
LEWINSON, supra note 38, at 86.
47. Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896). This case arose when the
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The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, emphasized features of the
disfranchising scheme that were nominally nonracial." These features
basically were benign compared to two mechanisms-the literacy test
and the white primary-which were not mentioned by the court but
which became the chief means of maintaining white supremacy.
The literacy provision, which was adopted eventually by every Deep
South state except Texas and Florida, required that an applicant for
registration demonstrate to the registrar his ability to read and write any
section of the state or United States Constitutions. 9 Literacy tests
aroused the most bitter opposition from those who feared that the dis-
franchisement of large numbers of illiterate whites could also result. To
meet this fear, most states established a number of alternatives to the
literacy test: an "understanding" test, property qualification, a good
character requirement, or most transparent of all, a "grandfather
clause."50 The key to the literacy test, and especially its alternatives,
Attorney General of Mississippi ruled that the poll tax could be enforced by levy. The Supreme
Court of Mississippi held in Ratliff that, since the poll tax was intended primarily "as a clog upon
the franchise," and only secondarily as a revenue measure, payment of the tax should not be
enforcible, because "it must be so construed as to carry into effect the purpose of the convention.
It is evident that, the more the payment of the tax is made compulsory, the greater will be the
number by whom it is paid, and therefore the less effectual will be the clause for the purpose it
was intended." Id. at 268, 20 So. at 869. Cf United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1963),
which involved a sheriff who had refused to accept poll tax payments from blacks.
48. One of the chief elements of the disfranchising solution was the imposition of prerequis-
ites to registering or voting which, while not necessarily difficult in themselves, amounted to an
endless series of impediments, any one of which could trip up the unwary voter or, as the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court described blacks, the voter who was "careless" or "without forethought." In
addition to requiring that the voter pay a poll tax long before the election, and making him keep
his poll tax receipts for several years to present on election day, the voter had to register 4 months
before the election in order to vote:
"The object of this section is to require the electorate to register at least four months before
an election at which they may offer to vote. It was also a part of the convention scheme to secure
an intelligent, watchful, and patriotic electorate, well knowing that the transient and thoughtless
and improvident people would not be so liable to register at such a length of time before the election
as would the more intelligent, patriotic and watchful voters. In other words, it was a part of the
scheme to acquire white supremacy, and the convention was searching the field of expedients for
methods to accomplish that end, which this section was one of the factors in obtaining.
"It is generally known that interest in elections is not so intense a few months before they
occur as in the closing days of the period just preceding the election. Often persons would register
and be ready to vote if they were permitted to do so by then registering and paying delinquent
taxes .. " G. ETHRIDGE, MISSISSIPPI CONSTITUTIONS 435 (1928).
49. In Virginia, there was a more insidious variant. Although no formal literacy test was
given, the registration application had to be completed without any assistance. This requirement
was implemented in many parts of the state by "blank check" registration forms, Le. the black
applicant would receive a blank piece of paper on which he was to provide by memory the
information specified in the Virginia Constitution. Remnants of this practice did not end until
Wilks v. Woodruff, C.A. No. 4073 (E.D. Va., Sept. 28, 1964).
50. The various alternatives to the literacy test were designed carefully to permit registration
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was that they were never intended to operate honestly." Instead, they
were designed to give the registrar an elastic standard to implement
the avowed intention of disfranchising blacks but not whites:
The delegates knew that the majority of their white Democratic constituents
wanted the Negro voter eliminated in a manner that would meet the requirements
of the Constitution of the United States. That same majority was determined that
no white voter should be barred. It so happened that no man could devise any test
which, fairly and honestly applied, would accomplish that purpose. There was a
general understanding that the interpretation of the Constitution offered by an
illiterate white man would be acceptable to the registrars; that of a Negro would
not.52
The other main vehicle for maintaining white supremacy was the
white primary. This technique, derived from Reconstruction days when
white Conservative Clubs united behind a single candidate, became for-
malized in the Deep South states at the turn of the century. Because no
doubt then existed that political parties were private organizations out-
side the purview of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, party pri-
maries could be completely closed to blacks. The white primary, there-
fore, coincided with the development of the one-party South,5 3 which
was complete by the end of the nineteenth century, when whites were
driven out of the Republican Party or out of the South. The absence of
any Republican opposition thus made victory in the Democratic pri-
mary tantamount to election; this, in turn meant that any one who
wished to cast an effective vote had to join the all-white Democratic
Party. This was the goal of those who had argued that black disfran-
chisement would safeguard white supremacy by eliminating divisions
among whites: "When the whites divide you will have the white men of
your State bidding for the Negro vote against each other."54
of illiterate whites. The typical grandfather clause exempted from literacy requirements those
who-or whose ancestors-were eligible to vote before 1868 or had fought honorably in a war for
the United States or the Confederacy. The efficacy of this scheme is suggested by evidence from
Georgia, where it was estimated that, of the 5 means of qualifying-having served in the army,
having an ancestor who served, literacy, good character, and owning property-the majority of
those blacks who were registered qualified under, of all things, the property clause.
51. "I do not expect [it] to be administered with any degree of friendship by the white man
to the suffrage of the black man. I expect the examination with which the black man will be
confronted, to be inspired with the same spirit that inspires every man in this convention . . . I
would not expect for the white man a rigid examination. The people of Virginia do not stand
impartially between the suffrage of the white man and the suffrage of the black man. If they did,
the uppermost thoughts in the hearts of every man within the sound of my voice would not be to
find a way of disfranchising the black man and enfranchising the white man. We do not come here
prompted by an impartial purpose in reference to Negro suffrage." Quoted in P. LEWINSON, supra
note 38, at 85.
52. V. WHARTON, supra note 24, at 215.
53. V. KEY, supra note 43, at 315-16, 619-21; G. TINDALL, supra note 34, at 83-91.
54. P. LEWINSON, supra note 38, at 89.
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B. Congress and Court Unconcerned
Any state apprehension about overstepping the bounds of the fif-
teenth amendment or prompting new federal intervention proved need-
less because Congress complaisantly repealed most of the Reconstruc-
tion statutes in 1894, saying: "'Let every trace of the reconstruction
measures be wiped from the statute books; let the States of this great
Union understand that the elections are in their own hands, and if there
be fraud, coercion, or force used they will be the first to feel it.' "Is Many
of the remaining statutes were repealed in 1909.11
Reflecting the same lack of concern, the Supreme Court found
procedural grounds for rejecting, without ever considering their merits,
six cases that challenged the disfranchising schemes of Virginia,57 Mis-
sissippi,58 South Carolina" and Alabama. 0 The Virginia and South Car-
olina cases were adjudged moot on the ground that the elections in
which the plaintiffs had wished to vote already had occurred. The other
three cases deserve more extended examination.
In Williams v. Mississippi," an 1898 decision, a black defendant
had been indicted and convicted by all-white juries. He thereafter moved
to set aside the indictment and verdict, arguing that blacks had been
intentionally disfranchised in his county and, since only registered voters
could serve on juries, had been intentionally excluded from serving on
his juries. The disfranchisement, he claimed, had been achieved by the
discriminatory exercise of local officials' discretion, as intended by the
1890 state constitution. The Supreme Court rejected his claim. Al-
though it acknowledged the Mississippi Supreme Court's statement in
Ratliff v. Beale that the 1890 convention "swept the field of expedients,
to obstruct the exercise of the suffrage by the negro race," the Supreme
Court nonetheless held that the federal constitution allows a state to
take advantage of "the alleged characteristics of the negro race."6 As
to the contention that the laws were in fact administered discriminato-
rily, the Supreme Court held that the allegation was insufficient because
it failed to indicate how, when, and by whom the discrimination was
55. H.R. REP. No. 18, 53d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1893), quoted in United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 335 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The repealer was the Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch.
25, 28 Stat. 36.
56. 35 Stat. 1088.
57. Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S. 153 (1904).
58. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
59. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895).
60. Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
61. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
62. 170 U.S. at 222.
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done. The Court therefore concluded that no constitutional rights were
violated because "the constitution of Mississippi and its statutes...
do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been
shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possi-
ble under them. 63
In 1903, the disfranchising schemes again were attacked in Giles
v. Harris and Giles v. Teasley, two successive Alabama suits. The Su-
preme Court promptly disposed of these attacks on procedural grounds
in two marvelously fatuous opinions,64 but nevertheless did admit the
basis of its underlying fear in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes:
63. 170 U.S. at 225. But see Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 229 (1904).
64. The 2 Giles cases rank high on the list of Supreme Court opinions that have shamed the
judicial process. Both cases involved Alabama's 1901 constitution, under which easy qualifications
were established and designed to fit whites but few blacks for registration before 1903, with stiff
literacy and other qualifications to come into play thereafter. Giles alleged that he and thousands
of other qualified blacks had been denied registration on account of race under the pre-1903 tests,
solely in order to subject them to the extremely high tests in effect after 1903.
In Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), plaintiff requested an injunction requiring officials to
place him and other qualified black applicants on the rolls. Mr. Justice Holmes seized upon the
allegation that these lists were illegal to hold that the Supreme Court could not order someone to
be placed upon such lists because it would be participating in an illegality. Concerning the argument
that placing qualified blacks on the lists would cure the discrimination, the Court responded: "If
the sections of the constitution concerning registration were illegal in their inception, it would be
a new doctrine in constitutional law that the original invalidity could be cured by an administration
which defeated their intent." 189 U.S. at 487. This doctrine was, of course, no newer than Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
In Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146 (1904), the same voter attempted to utilize 2 other remedies
in state court: mandamus to require the registration board to register him, and damages for its
failure to do so. Both claims were dismissed. Giles v. Teasley, 136 Ala. 164, 33 So. 819 (1903)
(damages); Giles v. Teasley, 136 Ala. 228, 33 So. 820 (1903) (mandamus). In dismissing the cases,
the Alabama Supreme Court took the same tack that Mr. Justice Holmes had taken in Giles v.
Harris-that is, the Alabama court took literally Giles' allegation that the new Alabama constitu-
tion was invalid as a grand disfranchising scheme. Starting from this point, the Alabama court
held that if Giles' allegation were correct (which it assumed) there was no valid registration board
authorized to register him-which meant there would be no valid board which the court could
mandamus, and which also meant that damages could not be awarded for the board's refusal,
because the board would be unauthorized to register him anyway.
On appeal the Supreme Court stated that, inasmuch as the Alabama court had accepted Giles'
claim that the constitution of 1901 was unconstitutional, it could hardly be said that his federal
claim had been denied. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on the grounds that
the decisions below rested upon state grounds "wholly independent" of the federal claim.
As to the damages, the Supreme Court said: "[C]onceding the allegations of the petition to
be true, and the registrars to have been appointed and qualified under a constitution which has for
its purpose to prevent negroes from voting and to exclude them from registration for that purpose,
no damage has been suffered by the plaintiff, because no refusal to register by a board thus
constituted in defiance of the Federal Constitution could have the effect to disqualify a legal voter,
otherwise entitled to exercise the elective franchise. In such a decision no right, immunity or
privilege, the creation of Federal authority, has been set up by the plaintiff in error and denied in
such wise as to give this court the right to review the state court decision." 193 U.S. at 164.
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[E]quity cannot undertake now, any more than it has in the past, to enforce political
rights . . . .In determining whether a court of equity can take jurisdiction, one of
the first questions is what it can do to enforce any order that it may make ...
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the
blacks from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the
plaintiff's name to be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. If the conspir-
acy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them. Unless
we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it
seems to us that all the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.
Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done,
as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them or
by the legislative and political department of the government of the United States. 5
C. Disfranchisement Becomes a Fixture
For more than a half century, virtually every disfranchising device
used by the various states survived, except those whose application was
either explicitly or inescapably limited precisely to blacks. The poll tax
was upheld in 1937,66 the literacy test was upheld in 1959,67 and white
primaries not mandated by the state were upheld by a unanimous Court
as late as 1935.6 The only devices that were outlawed were grandfather
clauses (in 1915,69 with an attempted modification invalidated in
As to the mandamus, its response was: "We do not perceive how this decision involved the
adjudication of a right claimed under the Federal Constitution against the appellant. It denies the
relief by way of mandamus, admitting the allegations of the petition as to the illegal character of
the registration authorized in pursuance of the Alabama Constitution.
"This is a ground adequate to sustain the decision and wholly independent of the rights set
up by the plaintiff as secured to him by the constitutional amendments for his protection." 193
U.S. at 165.
In short, said the Supreme Court, "in the present case the state court has not sustained the
right of the State to thus abridge the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. It has planted its decision
upon a ground independent of the alleged state action seeking to nullify the force and effect of the
constitutional amendments protecting the right of suffrage." 193 U.S. at 164. What the Court
meant by this statement is not clear, unless it was saying that, for Giles, being told he had the
right to vote was a perfectly good substitute for actually voting. In any event, Giles did not get to
register or vote, the boards of registrars continued to sit for the purpose of registering white people,
and the fifteenth amendment continued to coexist peacefully with Alabama's "simple-minded"
scheme (and countless others like it) for another half-century.
65. 189 U.S. at 487-88.
66. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
67. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
68. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
69. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915).
Among other things, these cases held explicitly that the invalidation of Oklahoma's and Maryland's
grandfather clause exemption from the literacy test must also invalidate the literacy test itself, i.e.
a requirement under which white people were exempted was essentially fictitious and the remedy
should be the elimination of that standard. 238 U.S. at 367. The Court also rejected the argu-
ment-which had puzzled it in Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166 (1904)-that invalidation of
the suffrage provisions would leave no suffrage right (and presumably no board to effectuate that
right), by holding that the pre-existing nondiscriminatory provisions would return to being.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
193970) and white primaries (in 1927, when ordered by the state,71 and
in 1944, when ordered by the political party itself72).
The results of the various disfranchising vehicles were electrifying.
By 1900 black registration in Louisiana had already dropped from
130,000 to 5,000; similar drops occured in other states. 73 Blacks were,
with rare exceptions in certain cities, wholly eliminated from the politi-
cal process. Great numbers of counties with large black majorities had
not a single black registered to vote. The social norm of disfranchise-
ment made attempts at black registration rare, and the effectiveness of
the devices sanctioned by the Supreme Court made successful attempts
virtually unique. Thus for most of the first half of the twentieth century,
any questions of black participation in politics and voting simply did not
exist.
A few indications of change appeared in the 1940's. In 1944, the
Supreme Court finally outlawed the white primary, in Smith v.
Allwright.74 The white primary had been the most effective and simplest
way of disfranchising blacks, and its demise left complex discretionary
registration systems as the major line of defense.75 In 1949, however, an
Alabama district court outlawed that state's new "understand and ex-
plain" test on the ground-unsuccessfully advanced in the two Giles
cases 40 years before-that the test had been designed to give registrars
the opportunity to discriminate, an opportunity that they were, in fact,
exercising. By affirming the lower court's judgment, the Supreme Court
thus implicitly overruled the Giles cases.
76
Since the grandfather clauses used by other states had been temporary, the Guinn and Myers
decisions effectively ended use of that device, except for the variant involved in Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939).
70. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
71. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); accord, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
72. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
73. C. WOODWARD, supra note 37, at 342-46.
74. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
75. Several states but most notably South Carolina, made unsuccessful attempts to continue
the white primary in another guise. See, e.g., Brown v. Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (E.D.S.C. 1948),
afid, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1947), affd, 165
F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); V. KEY, supra note 43, at 625-43.
Other states tried other means to shore up their defenses. In 1950 South Carolina revived its
full-slate law. See note 127 infra. In 1955 Mississippi replaced its alternative literacy or understand-
ing test with a double literacy and understanding test; and in 1946 Alabama adopted the Boswell
amendment. Georgia's new defenses relied heavily on reregistration, purging, and challenges.
Bernd & Holland, Recent Restrictions Upon Negro Suffrage: The Case of Georgia, 21 J. POLIMS
487 (1959).
76. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), affd mem., 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
At this time and also into the 1950's a number of other suits were brought which challenged
discriminatory registration practices. On the whole, the results were disappointing. Even when
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Other events in the 1940's laid the groundwork for further far-
reaching changes. One was resumption of enforcement activities by the
Justice Department, which began with the creation of a Civil Rights
Section of the Criminal Division in 1939. 71 The first important case
brought by that Section was United States v. Classic, in which the
Supreme Court expanded congressional power over federal elections.7
The case involved five men who were charged with stealing votes and
altering the count in a congressional primary in Louisiana. Although it
had been clear since Siebold and Yarbrough79 that the right to vote in a
federal election is a federal right, which Congress is authorized to
protect, intervening cases made it doubtful that the federal election
power included primaries. 0 Classic overruled these intervening cases
and held that the primary, as "an integral part of the procedure of
choice" of a federal representative, was covered by the federal right to
vote.
Classic led directly to Smith v. Allwright,8' which outlawed the
white primary, since Classic's recognition of the primary as an integral
part of the election process enabled the Court to conclude that excluding
procedural hurdles were overcome, an injunction was denied or otherwise limited to generalities.
See, e.g., Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951); Mitchell v.
Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946), on remand, 69 F. Supp. 698
(M.D. Ala. 1947); Hall v. Nagel, 154 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1946). But see Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp.
442 (W.D. La.), affd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1952); Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. La.
1950).
The frustration of this period is reflected in Sellers v. Wilson, 123 F. Supp. 907 (M.D. Ala.
1954), which described a typical hide-and-seek game played by the registrar of Bullock County,
Alabama, and found a fifteenth amendment violation. The court in Sellers went on to say: "The
supreme law of this republic is that no tests can be required of a Negro applicant as a pre-requisite
to registration as a voter that is [sic] not required of a white applicant; therefore, let no Board of
Registrars try to devise any scheme or artifice to do otherwise." 123 F. Supp. at 920.
The court, however, found no damages and, because the Board had resigned, held that it could
not grant an injunction. The plaintiffs won only the hollow admonition that "the court retains
jurisdiction of the case and will grant the injunctive relief prayed for in plaintiffs' petition in the
event either or all of these defendants again become members of this Board." Id.
For a comparison of the situations in the mid-1940's and in the mid-1950's see Jackson, Race
and Suffrage in the South Since 1940, 3 NEW SOUTH, Nos. 5 & 6 (Southern Regional Council
1948), Price, The Negro Voter in the South, 12 NEw SOUTH, No. 9 (Southern Regional Council
1957).
77. The early years of the Civil Rights Section are described in R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTEC-
TION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
78. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Classic arose under 18 U.S.C. §§ 51 & 52 (now 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
& 242 (1970)), which were derived from § 6 & 17 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat. 140.
79. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), United States v. Gradwell, 243
U.S. 476 (1917). See also United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918).
81. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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blacks from primaries materially affected their right to vote.82 The deci-
sion in Classic had several other significant repercussions. It foresha-
dowed broad definitions of "voting" by holding that the right to vote
included the right to have one's vote counted as it was cast. And its
treatment of the relation between article I, section 4, of the Constitution
(dealing with regulation of federal elections) and article I, section 2
(dealing with state-imposed qualifications) suggested that Congress'
power over federal elections might extend to the alteration of state voter
qualifications and thus might include the power to ban poll taxes and
literacy tests.8"
Changes were proceeding at other levels. Black pressure against
existing conditions increased, especially with the coming of the New
Deal and World War II. The composition of the Supreme Court
changed. In 1947, the President's Committee on Civil Rights issued a
report entitled To Secure These Rights. In addition to ending segregated
schools and employment discrimination some of its recommendations
were: the abolition of the poll tax by statute or constitutional amend-
ment; enactment of new statutes to protect the right to vote, creation
of a permanent United States Commission on Civil Rights; and addi-
tional authority for the Justice Department in civil rights matters, in-
cluding the authority to intervene in private litigation and to bring its
own civil suits for damages, injunctions, or declaratory judgments. 4
Each of these recommendations for guaranteeing the right to vote even-
tually was implemented, once Brown v. Board of Education provided
an effective catalyst for change. Moreover, when the effects of the new
emphasis on voting rights were felt, Congress again led the way, by
passing legislation, which, in many instances, was patterned after the
long-abandoned Reconstruction statutes.
III. MODERN ENFRANCHISEMENT
A new era began in 1957, when Congress overcame a weak filibus-
ter to pass the first civil rights law since 1875. The prior cases had
established a twofold right to vote: a right to vote in federal elections,
82. Smith flatly overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), which had held unani-
mously that political parties were private clubs free to discriminate so long as there was no state
involvement. Although the Smith opinion took pains to cloud the issue, it was plain that Grove),
had been overruled by Classic, with the Smith case simply announcing the inevitable. In any event,
the Smith decision elicited a bitter dissent from Justice Roberts, who complained that the new
Court's readiness to overrule earlier cases "tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." 321 U.S. at 669.
83. The latter suggestion was intentional, according to Chief Justice Stone, who wrote the
Classic opinion. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE 588-89 (1956).
84. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 151-73 (1947).
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which Congress could protect against both state and private interfer-
ence, and a right to be free of racial discrimination in voting, which it
was then thought Congress could protect only against state action. The
approach used in the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and also in the Civil
Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964, was to build upon those powers that the
courts had upheld-chiefly the congressional power over federal elec-
tions-and to facilitate litigation both by private parties and the Justice
Department. The latter goal was, in part, implemented by authorizing
the Justice Department to bring civil suits rather than only cumbersome
criminal cases. It was soon realized, however, that piecemeal litigation,
even by the Justice Department, would not achieve widespread registra-
tion. Eventually, the barriers to black voting were broken down not by
litigation under these Acts, but by sweeping assertions of congressional
power in the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Nevertheless, the Acts of 1957,
1960, and 1964 were seminal sources for the 1965 Act, because they
adopted progressively more stringent remedies which were accepted by
the courts. This court approval consequently notified Congress that the
old Supreme Court cases would no longer impede its power to pass
strong enforcing legislation under the fifth section of the fourteenth
amendment and the second section of the fifteenth amendment.
A. Civil Rights Act of 19575
The 1957 Act was essentially a codification of the major recom-
mendations in the 1947 President's Committee report, To Secure These
Rights. The Act created a Commission on Civil Rights, and upgraded
the Civil Rights Section to a division of the Justice Department. As for
substance, Congress built upon the statute dealing specifically with the
right to vote, section 1 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, which provided
that all citizens otherwise qualified to vote in any state or federal elec-
tion were entitled to vote in any such election without discrimination on
account of race."5 To section 1, which represented an exercise of Con-
gress' fifteenth amendment power, a provision was added, which repre-
sented an exercise of its power over federal elections. This new provision
prohibited anyone, whether or not acting under color of law, from inter-
fering with any person's right to vote in a federal election.87 Perhaps
most significant was another provision that authorized the United
States to sue anyone who had violated or was about to violate any other
85. Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71 Stat. 634. The background of the 1957 Act is described in J.
ANDERSON, EiSENHOWER, BROWNELL AND THE CONGRESS (1964).
86. Section 1 is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(1) (1970).
87. Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131(c)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1970).
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person's voting rights-either the right to vote in federal elections or the
right to be free from racial discrimination in voting.8
B. Civil Rights Act of 19609
The few suits that were brought under the 1957 Act exposed several
weaknesses in the Act. The Civil Rights Act of 1960 was designed to
close those and other loopholes and to streamline voting litigation fur-
ther. The central feature of the 1960 Act was its creation of federal
referees, who would be appointed upon a finding that particular acts of
discrimination were pursuant to a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
tion and whose duties would continue until a finding that the "pattern
or practice" had ceased. The referee was to register any applicant who
demonstrated that he was qualified to vote under prevailing state law
or standards, and that he had been denied registration by state officials
since the finding of a "pattern or practice" of discrimination." The
words "qualified under State law" were defined to mean qualified ac-
cording to the laws, customs or usages of the state, but could not include
qualifications more stringent than those previously applied to white
applicants by discriminating registrars. This provision had the effect of
"freezing" state voter qualifications at the level at which they had been
applied to whites regardless of any state laws formally prescribing
higher standards for black voters. For example, if literacy tests had been
waived for whites, the freeze doctrine now waived them for blacks.9
The 1960 Act's provisions indicated that Congress was seeking to
write elastic legislation whose coverage and application would encom-
pass new state attempts to evade the specific provisions of the law.
88. Id. § 131(c)(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970). The 1957 Act also included 2jurisdictional
improvements. First, § 121(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970), added a new jurisdictional basis for
suits under federal civil rights statutes, which was not based on jurisdictional amount or state
action. Second, § 131(c)(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(d) (1970), allowed plaintiffs to bring voting dis-
crimination cases directly in federal court without exhausting the elaborate administrative remedies
that some states had established to shield their registrars. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3224-31 (Supp.
1972). See also Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951).
89. Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86. The background of the 1960 Act is described in D.
BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW (2d ed. 1966).
90. Pub. L. No. 86-449, § 601(a), 74 Stat. 90 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1970)). The
court itself,.upon finding a pattern or practice, could unilaterally examine voters' qualifications.
Most courts themselves fulfilled this responsibility, and only one referee was appointed under this
provision. D. STRONG, NEGROES, BALLOTS AND JUDGES 52-55 (1968).
91. The freeze doctrine, while seemingly extreme, was consistent with equitable remedies
developed by the courts in similar discrimination cases. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See Note, The Federal Voting Referee Plan




Moreover, this Act evoked two important concepts framed in Classic:
first, the freezing of state qualifications came close to altering those
qualifications, as Classic had suggested might be done; secondly, the
1960 Act included a definition of voting that integrated all the steps of
the "procedure of choice" that cumulatively had been developed in
earlier cases.2
C. Civil Rights Act of 196491
Four years later and after dozens of frustrating cases under the
1960 Act, Congress finally implemented the Classic suggestion and used
its power over federal elections to alter state qualifications for voters in
federal electionsY The major new voting provisions were four sections
aimed at the most flagrant methods of manipulating literacy tests. One
section required state registrars to apply the freeze doctrine, i.e. to
register blacks under the same standards as those which traditionally
had been applied to whites. 5 A second section required that any literacy,
understanding, or interpretation test be given entirely in writing. A
third section barred the use of immaterial errors, such as word misspell-
ings, to deny registration . 7 Finally, a fourth section provided that a
sixth-grade education was rebuttable evidence of literacy in any voting
discrimination suit brought by the Justice Department." The applicabil-
ity of these provisions was, nevertheless, limited to voting in, or qualify-
ing to vote in, federal elections.
Before they were tested, a rush of events overtook the voting provi-
sions of the 1964 Act. Congress despaired of using litigation to secure
voting rights and instead, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, simply
92. The 1960 Act also required election officials to maintain all records relating to any
federal election for 22 months after the election, and to make them available to the Attorney
General. Civil Rights Act of 1960, §§ 301-06, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1974-74e (1970). The 1960 Act also
provided that a registrar's discriminatory acts should be deemed those of the state, which might
be joined as a party defendant in any suit. Id. § 601(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970). This provision
solved the problem of what to do when the registrar resigned and left no one against whom an
injunction might issue. See United States v. Alabama, 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 267
F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded, 362 U.S. 602 (1960).
93. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
94. Congress' power in this regard was analyzed in Note, note 91 supra, which was written
in 1963 when a bill that contained the outline of what became the 1964 Act had just been intro-
duced.
95. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 101(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(A) (1970).
96. Id. § 101(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (1970).
97. Id. § 101(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(B) (1970).
98. Id. § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970). The 1964 Act also dealt with the problem of
the foot-dragging federal judge by authorizing the Attorney General to request a 3-judge court and
expedited treatment in any case that requested a finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
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abolished some state standards and put others in the hands of federal
officials. The main provisions of the 1965 Act evinced a new approach
to securing voting rights and are, therefore, discussed separately below.
The 1965 Act, however, took one final step, in section 15, to broaden
the litigation approach of the three previous Acts. Section 15 amended
the three Acts by striking the limiting word "federal" from the coverage
of each substantive provision, and by eliminating wholly the definition
of "federal election" from the Code.9 Congress' decision to assert its
broad powers under the fifteenth amendment rather than to proceed
cautiously under its power over federal elections was indicative of its
new directions.
D. Application of the New Civil Rights Acts
In terms of voters registered and protected, the record of eight
years of streamlined litigation as a remedy for disfranchisement reveals
a dismal account of enormous effort generated in attempting to over-
come pervasive lawlessness by election officials. 00 This lawlessness gen-
erally was met by unconcern on the part of federal district judges in the
Deep South states, so that it was not until cases began reaching the Fifth
Circuit that any significant enfranchisement occurred. In this eight-year
period, the United States filed 71 suits under these provi-
sions-including actions against discriminatory registration practices,
suits directed at private or official intimidation, and suits simply to
obtain registrars' records.' 0' Three of these suits were omnibus actions
against Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi, in which the Justice De-
partment attacked broad portions of those states' voter qualifications
in the categories of literacy, understanding and citizenship tests.0 2 The
99. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 15, 79 Stat. 445. The limitation to
federal elections did remain in 42 U.S.C. 1971(b), which prohibited anyone, whether acting under
color of law or not, from interfering with the right to vote in federal elections.
100. See B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964); P. WATTERS & R. CLEG-
HORN, CLIMBING JACOB'S LADDER 211-43 (Harbinger ed. 1967); D. STRONG, note 90 supra. A
voting case might take as many as 6,000 man-hours to prepare. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966).
101. Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 5 (1965). The history of the litigation is summarized in D. STRONG,
note 90 supra, and in 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1533-41 (3d ed. 1967). The cases are spelled out in detail in Hearings on S.
1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1175-1445 (1965).
102. United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964); rev'd, 380 U.S. 128
(1965), on remand, 256 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Miss. 1966); United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. La. 1963), affd, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), on remand, 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966),
affd, 386 U.S. 270 (1967); United States v. Baggett, Civ. No. 2159-N (M.D. Ala., filed Jan. 15,
1965) (dismissed after passage of the Voting Rights Act, April 5, 1966).
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total result of this effort was that the percentages of registered blacks
increased as follows: Mississippi, from 4.4 percent in 1954 to 6.4 percent
in 1965; Alabama, from 14.2 percent in 1958 to 19.4 percent in 1964;
and Louisiana, from 31.7 percent in 1956 to 31.8 percent in 1965.103
Clearly, it was time for a change.
On the other hand, this litigation led to a judicial climate that
definitely had future significance. Although most of the cases that cre-
ated this climate are principally of historical interest now, they neverthe-
less involved significant legal questions. One of the most significant,
practically and symbolically, was the constitutionality of the new stat-
utes themselves, which was settled in United States v. Raines,14 the first
case brought under the 1957 Act. Raines, which involved discrimination
by the registrar of Terrell County, Georgia, was brought by the United
States under 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1970), which authorized such a suit
"[w]henever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any person is about to engage in" discriminatory conduct.
The district court held section 1971(c) unconstitutional because the
words "any person" might be construed to allow suits to enjoin purely
private action designed to deprive citizens of the right to vote on account
of their race or color.' The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
lower court decision and held the statute constitutional. Noting that the
Reese case had arisen in the context of a criminal case, the Court gave
short shrift to the Reese overbreadth argument and held that Registrar
Raines, whose conduct was clearly official, could not claim that the
statute was unconstitutional because of its possible application to some-
one else: "[T]o the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsistent
with what we think the better one and the one established by the weighti-
est of the subsequent cases, we cannot follow it here."' °
Apart from exhibiting a totally new attitude toward the constitu-
tionality of federal civil rights legislation, the cases under the 1957-64
Acts settled other questions. First, the freezing principle, as an equitable
remedy, was adopted explicitly and made the norm for most cases.
0 7
Secondly, the courts finally began to recognize that, when countless
whites but virtually no blacks were registered, a presumption was cre-
103. Hearings on H.R. 6400, supra note 101, at 4.
104. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
105. United States v. Raines, 172 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ga. 1959) (applying United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876)).
106. 362 U.S. at 24.
107. E.g., United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Duke, 332




ated that, in effect, shifted the burden of proof to the state.' Finally,
the courts became accustomed to doing what Justice Holmes in the
Giles decision had thought impossible-supervising in detail the opera-
tions of local election officials.109 All these principles and attitudes were
instrumental in formulating the pattern of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and in encouraging courts to give meaningful relief in subsequent
cases.
E. Voting Rights Act of 1965110
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a bold assertion of federal
power to enforce the fifteenth amendment by stringent measures. It
responded to the ability of the Southern States to stay one step ahead
of federal law, the futility of the litigation method of securing voting
rights, and the emotional national mood created by a series of outrages
against blacks and civil rights workers.
The Act is a comprehensive scheme for regulating the details of
certain states' election process both as to registration and voting, and
contains a special provision, section 5, which is designed to thwart any
future attempts to evade the Act. The act's core feature is a coverage
formula-commonly known as the "trigger"-by which its stringent
provisions would be applied only in states or parts of states that have
literacy tests or similar devices and in which either the registration or
voter turnout figure for 1964 was less than 50 percent of the voting-age
population."' In these states or subdivisions, two provisions apply
108. United States v. Hines, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1332 (1964); see Alabama v. United
States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1962) ("In the problem of racial discrimination, statistics often
tell much, and Courts listen.")
109. See Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1962) (district court held
empowered to "engage in a most detailed supervision of the day-to-day operation of voter registra-
tion").
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1970).
IlI. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1970). The jurisdictions initially covered by the trigger provision
were: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia; 40 counties in
North Carolina; and several non-Southern areas.
Under § 4(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970), a jurisdiction can terminate its cover-
age by suing the United States in the federal district court for the District of Columbia and
obtaining a declaratory judgment, which certifies that for at least 5 years-since amended to 10
years-it has not used a literacy test or similar device with the purpose or effect of discriminating
on account of race. Because most of the covered Southern States continued to use a literacy test
until it was suspended on the effective date of the Act, August 6, 1965, a declaratory judgment
could be obtained only after the Act had been in effect for the requisite 5-year-now 10-
year-period. The common description of the Voting Rights Act as having a life of 5 years is,
therefore, a shorthand reference to the period required before a covered jurisdiction can obtain the
declaratory judgment terminating its coverage.
Several of the non-Southern jurisdictions have obtained early termination judgments by estab-
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everywhere, while two other provisions apply wherever the Attorney
General finds they are needed:
(I) In each covered state or subdivision, any "test or device,"
principally the literacy test, is suspended for five years (now extended
to ten years) (section 4(a));111
(2) Each covered state or subdivision must gain prior approval
from federal authorities before making any changes in voting laws or
procedures; with approval being given only if the state or subdivision
can show its change is not racially discriminatory in purpose or effect
(section 5);111
(3) In those counties of covered states or subdivisions where the
Attorney General believes local registrars are not adequately complying
with the Act, he can designate federal examiners with full power to
register any qualified voter (sections 6 and 7);114
(4) In the federal examiner counties, when deemed necessary by
the Attorney General, he can designate federal observers to attend elec-
tions with full power to observe all parts of the election pro-
cess-reminiscent of the federal supervisors created by the 1871 amend-
ments to the Enforcement Act (section 8).115
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,16 the Supreme Court held the
lishing that the test they have used is not discriminatory; but a North Carolina county was refused
a declaratory judgment on the ground that its maintenance of unequal education facilities for many
years made any literacy test inherently discriminatory. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S.
285 (1969). The theory of the Gaston County case makes it unlikely that any other Southern
jurisdiction can obtain early termination. See p. 563 infra.
The Act was "extended" for 5 years in 1970, Le. the time required before a state is eligible to
seek a declaratory judgment was expanded to 10 years. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314. At the same time, coverage was broadened to include any
states or subdivisions which met the trigger formula (use of a test and less than 50% registration
or turnout) for the year 1968. The new formula affected several new non-Southern areas, including
three counties in New York (constituting the boroughs of Brooklyn, Manhattan and the Bronx).
These counties have obtained a declaratory judgment terminating coverage, but that judgment has
been appealed by black voters who intervened in the declaratory judgment suit brought by New
York against the United States. New York v. United States, Civil No. 2419-71 (D.D.C., Apr. 13,
1972), juris. postponed sub non. NAACP v. New York, 409 U.S. 978 (1972). See generally
WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, THE SHAMEFUL BLIGHT 2 (1972).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970). The term "test or device" is defined in § 4(c), 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1970): "The phrase 'test or device' shdll mean any requirement that a person
as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write,
understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge
of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the
voucher of registered voters or members of any other class."
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). This section is discussed in detail at pp. 576-81 infra.
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973d-e (1970).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (1970).
116. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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Act constitutional. The Court began by stating that section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment gives Congress broad power to devise specific rem-
edies for voting discrimination and to apply those remedies to particular
locations. The Court then proceeded to uphold the specific remedies ripe
for attack by South Carolina, including those described above-except
the use of observers, which had not yet occurred. The opinion reflected
an extraordinary sensitivity to the problems of racial discrimination in
voting, and concluded with the thought that "[h]opefully, millions of
non-white Americans will now be able to participate for the first time
on an equal basis in the government under which they live." '
The Act was an immediate success. The effect on voters, and regis-
trars, of suspending literacy tests and of installing federal examiners to
register voters in problem areas was electric." 8 By 1967, the percentage
of blacks registered in the covered states had risen sharply,"9 and has
continued to rise to the point where black registration today is not far
below white registration in many parts of the South.120
IV. NEW FORMS OF SUBTLE DISCRIMINATION
The Voting Rights Act successfully destroyed the pattern of formal
and near-total disfranchisement that had been built up since 1890, and
produced a situation reminiscent of the 1870's and 1880's. The States'
responses to black enfranchisement also have paralleled their responses
of a century ago, with heavy emphasis on facially neutral techniques.12'
Instead of preventing blacks from registering, the focus of discrimina-
117. Id. at 337.
118. A number of"eleventh-hour" efforts to stop enforcement of the Voting Rights Act were
unsuccessful. Several state courts granted injunctions prohibiting registrars or examiners from
ignoring state literacy statutes, but these injunctions were quickly blocked by federal courts. E.g.,
United States v. Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966); United States v. Mississippi, 256
F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Ala. 1965); cf.
McCann v. Paris, 244 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. La. 1965). The theory behind the suspension of state
literacy requirements was described cogently in a concurring opinion by Judge Rives in Dent v.
Duncan, 360 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1966).
119. The percentage of blacks of voting age registered in the 6 states whose literacy tests
were suspended statewide-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina and Vir-
ginia-went from 25.9% in 1965 to 52.4% in 1967. In those 2 years, the applicable figures for
Mississippi went from 6.7% to 59.8%. The figures are shown, by county, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 225-56 (1968).
120. Registration figures by race are notoriously unreliable. The Census Bureau, however,
estimates that in the South-including Border and some Southwest states-69% of the voting-age
whites are registered, compared to 64% of the voting-age blacks. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, VOTER-PARTICIPATION IN NOVEMBER 1972, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 244 (1972). Other estimates generally show a difference of 15-20%
between white and black registration figures in the Deep South.
121. See pp. 536-38 supra.
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tion shifted to preventing blacks from using their eligibility to gain any
significant political power. In short, the shift was from preventing
blacks from voting to preventing blacks from winning or deciding elec-
tions.
The methods used since 1965 have varied widely, often reflecting
ad hoe adaptations to particular situations."' Apart from some instan-
ces of fraud, intimidation, and economic pressure, the major forms of
discrimination have fallen into three categories: vote dilution, barriers
to gaining public office, and hindrances to black voters. Some of the
specific methods used include the following:
Dilution:
(1) Racial gerrymandering, e.g. drawing legislative districts to di-
vide concentrations of black voting strength; 
1 3
(2) altering the racial composition of a town or county by annexing
or deannexing territory or consolidating political units;'24
(3) requiring a run-off election between the two highest candidates
if no candidate wins a majority in the first election;'
122. Much of the development in Southern politics since the passage of the Voting Rights
Act is contained in a comprehensive report issued by the Civil Rights Commission in 1968. U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, note 119 supra. The list of discriminatory mechanisms on the next few
pages is adapted largely from the findings there listed. Id. at 171-74.
123. See generally id. at 26-35; note 217 infra; WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note
I ll, at 93-108. The mechanisms discussed in this section have a dilutive or discriminatory effect
primarily where, as in most of the South, racial bloc voting is a factor. Where this pattern of voting
is in evidence, large numbers of black voters tend to support the candidate, white or black, whom
they perceive as favoring their interests, while white voters tend to an equal or greater degree to
support his opponent. As V. 0. Key put it, "In all [the southern states], the presence of large
numbers of Negroes has been influential in determining the lines of political division and often in
diverting the attention of the electorate from nonracial issues." V. KEY, supra note 43, at 254. The
cumulative effect of discriminatory mechanisms used in combination (including gerrymandering,
at-large elections, a majority requirement, a numbered place system, and high filing fees) is
graphically described in a study of Houston. C. DAVIDSON, BIRACIAL POLITICS 52-82 (1972).
124. See Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party v. Johnson, 299 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Miss.
1969); N. MCMILLAN, THE CITIZEN'S COUNCIL 220-21 (1971); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 119, at 25-26; WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note Ill, at 132-35; note 245
infra.
125. Where blacks are a minority, they may still win an office in a plurality election if whites
split their votes among several candidates; on the other hand, a majority requirement entails a
runoff in which white voters can consolidate to defeat the black voters and their favored candidates.
For example, Mississippi, which requires a majority only in primaries, repeatedly has sought to
adopt such a requirement for general elections because of the fear that a black candidate (e.g.,
Charles Evers, 1971 candidate for the governorship) might win by a white split. See e.g., Graves
v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725, 732 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Evers v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
327 F. Supp. 640 (S.D. Miss. 1971). See also V. KEY, supra note 43, at 416-23; W. ToWE,
BARRIERS TO BLACK POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 20 (Voter Ed. Project 1972);
R. YOUNG, THE PLACE SYSTEM IN TEXAS POLITICS 24-27 (U. Texas: Inst. Pub. Affairs 1965).
Majority requirements have elicited a higher percentage of objections than almost any other voting
change submitted under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See note 245 infra.
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(4) using at-large elections where black voting is concentrated in
particular election districts;" 6
(5) making at-large elections even more unfair to minorities by
superimposing various rules that prevent a minority from concentrating
its votes to take advantage of a split among the majority group:
(a) full-slate laws (also known as anti-single-shot laws), which
require a voter to vote for as many candidates as there are offices to be
filled;121
(b) numbered place laws, which designate each position by a
separate number, require each candidate to qualify for a specific num-
126. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966). See pages 573-75 infra; W. TOWE,
supra note 125, at 14-17; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 108-26. This tech-
nique, one of the most favored, has been noted in much of the political science literature. E. LADD,
NEGRO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTH 29-30, 102-03, 307 (Atheneum ed. 1969); D. MAT-
THEWS & J. PROTHRO, NEGROES AND THE NEw SOUTHERN POLITICS 4, 144, 208, 221 (Harcourt
Brace ed. 1966); J. WILSON, NEGRO POLITICS 24-28, 31 (1960); Jewell, Local Systems of Represen-
tation: Political Consequences and Judicial Choices, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 790, 802-03 (1968).
The past decade has been a virtual epidemic of at-large election laws in the deep South,
especially in Mississippi and Louisiana. One of the laws was an amendment to MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 3374-76 requiring all cities to elect their councilmen at large. Laws of 1962, ch. 537 (May 29,
1962). The new law was passed in 1962 after its sponsor said "the measure would prevent one ward
from getting enough Negro voters to elect an alderman," and that the law was "needed to maintain
our Southern way of life." The Jackson-Clarion-Ledger, Feb. I, 1962, at 1; id., Mar. 2, 1962, at
1.
Creating larger districts will also increase the cost of campaigning, Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.
Supp. 704, 720-21 (W.D. Texas), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 840 (1972), and may increase the
number of petition signatures required. Bush v. Sebesta, - F. Supp. - (M.D. Fla. 1972),
appeal pending, No. 72-455 (1972).
127. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 35-39. If there are, for example, 7
offices to be filled, a full-slate law means that a voter who is interested in only 2 candidates not
only will cast 2 of his votes for those candidates but must cast 5 votes against them (i.e. for their
opponents) if he wishes his vote to count. Preventing black voters from "single-shotting" thus
deprives them of the one way in which they gain some political influence. W. TOwE, supra note
126, at 17-20; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 35-39; WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT, supra note I 11, at 127-31.
Furthermore, the requirement that a voter cast a vote for a candidate against his wishes is
repugnant to the first amendment, and its effect is insidious: "But you've got to select ten. And in
selecting that ten, you might get a grand rascal in there that you don't want, but you've got to
hold your nose and take him, because you are forced. And that way no voter in South Carolina
has the right that he should have in the elective process, when he's forced to vote for somebody he
may not want in order to support somebody he does want." Testimony of Modjeska Simkins, Vol.
I, p. 23, introduced into evidence in Stevenson v. West, C.A. No. 74-75 (D.S.C., April 7, 1972).
The full-slate law is less justifiable than virtually any other voting restriction ever devised.
It was struck down in North Carolina and South Carolina in 1972. See cases cited notes 229-30
infra. On the other hand, it has been previously upheld in Gordon v. Meeks, 394 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.
1968); Amedee v. Fowler, 257 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. La. 1967); Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713
(S.D. Ala. 1962).
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bered place, and allow each voter to vote for only one candidate in each
place;1
21
(c) staggered terms, which achieve the same end as numbered
places, except that the offices are separated chronologically; and"'
(6) splitting the vote for a strong black candidate by nominating
additional blacks as "straw" candidates for the same office. 3 '
Barriers to gaining public office:
(1) Abolishing offices or making them appointive;'
(2) extending the term of white incumbents;
1 12
(3) limiting the responsibilities of offices likely to be won by
blacks; 3 1
(4) imposing stiff formal requirements for qualifying to run in pri-
128. "It is clear that the numbered seat law may have the effect of curtailing minority voting
power. In a true at-large election, if the majority spreads its vote around and the minority single
shot votes, the minority strength is concentrated, thus increasing their chance of electing. However,
if the minority candidate is forced to run against a specific candidate or candidates for a specific
seat, the majority can readily identify for whom they must vote in order to defeat the minority
candidate." Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206, 213 n.9 (E.D.N.C. 1972). See also Graves v.
Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725, 732 n.20 (W.D. Tex. 1972); W. TowE, supra note 125, at 27-28;
WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 11, at 127-31; R. YOUNG, supra note 125, at 20-
23; Edsall, State Legislatures & Legislative Representation, 30 J. POLITICS 277, 286-87, 289 (1968).
The Justice Department has objected to a higher percentage of numbered place systems than any
other change submitted under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See notes 245-46 infra.
129. Any method-such as staggered terms or residence requirements-under which not all
candidates run against each other will have the same effect as the numbered place system because
it diminishes or eliminates the single-shot possibility. WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra
note Ill, at 130.
130. See, e.g., Henderson v. ASCS, 317 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
131. Bunton v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
119, at 40-41. Curiously, when a large number of offices are to be filled by a single appointing
official, it may be more discriminatory to shift to elections, especially at-large elections. For
example, while a suit which challenged the failure of the Governor of Mississippi to appoint any
blacks to the 410 count election commission posts was pending, a new law was passed making those
offices elective, in at-large countywide elections. Allen v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir.
1969). Few blacks have been elected to these posts, whereas retention of the appointive system
might have resulted in a court order requiring a substantial number of black appointments. For
example, in Evers v. Williams, C.A. No. 4288 (S.D. Miss., June 10, 1969), which was settled during
the pendency of a Fifth Circuit appeal, the Governor agreed to appoint blacks, as vacancies
opened, to every county draft board in rough proportion to the percentage of blacks residing in
the county.
132. See Sellers v. Trussell, 253 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Ala. 1966); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 41-42.
133. In Claiborne County, Mississippi, county officials have blocked attempts by a newly
elected black tax collector to reassess property. A variant is to shift fee-producing responsibilities
to a white official. For example, in Leake County, Mississippi, where 2 Justices of the Peace shared
jurisdiction over the same area and traditionally shared cases as well, a newly elected black Justice
was left with little or nothing to do, and no fees to earn, when law officers making arrests brought
all defendants before the white Justice.
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mary or general elections, e.g., high filing fees, numerous nominating
petitions, or complex oaths;
1 34
(5) withholding pertinent information about qualifying require-
ments or other aspects of the election process;'
(6) withholding certification, on technical grounds, of black candi-
dates', nominating petitions; '
(7) excluding or interfering with black candidates' poll watchers;
and 37
(8) imposing barriers to the assumption of office by successful
black candidates.
3
134. See Harper v. West, C.A. No. 72-1256 (D.S.C., Oct. 6, 1972); United Citizens Party
v. South Carolina Election Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1970); Whitley v. Johnson, 296 F.
Supp. 754 (S.D. Miss. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1968);
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 43-47; WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra
note 11l, at 72-73.
135. United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., C.A. No. 6047-70 (S.D. Ala., Dec. 22,
1970); Bynum v. Burns, 379 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1967); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
119, at 48-55.
136. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
119, at 55-58.
One of the best examples of obstruction through minor technicalities was a 1966 Mississippi
law, which involved the procedure for qualifying as a candidate for school trustee in certain types
of small school districts, most of which are heavily black. These elections take place not at regular
polling precincts but at a meeting held at a local school. Before 1966 few blacks had attended these
meetings and no black had been elected school trustee in any of these districts within living
memory.
After blacks began to register in large numbers in 1965, the legislature suddenly responded
by amending the procedure for qualifying as a candidate for school trustee. Where formerly one
could simply go to the meeting and seek this office, the new amendment, Miss. CODE
ANN. § 6328-09 (Cum. Supp. 1972), provided that a prospective candidate must present a petition
with 25 signatures, plus a description of his qualifications in an affidavit, and an additional
affidavit, which the candidate apparently has to obtain from the registrar, in which it is certified
that his petition contains the requisite number of registered voters' signatures. Furthermore, the
petition has to be presented 10 days before the election, but notice of the election is not given until
7 days before the election. None of these requirements was especially onerous but the combination
of trivialities invited oversight or error, and according to the statute, any misstep was fatal to one's
candidacy. The new amendment finally was adopted and went into effect, without publicity, 48
hours before the qualifying deadline for the 1966 elections. Several predominantly white districts,
however, were exempted from the amendment's coverage for the 1966 elections.
Several voters and candidates sued, alleging that this statute violated the fifteenth amendment
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A Mississippi district court, in Boyd v.
Johnson, C.A. No. 668 (N.D. Miss., March 2, 1966), thereafter enjoined enforcement of the new
qualifying requirements for the 1966 elections.
137. See Gray v. Main, 309 F. Supp. 207 (M.D. Ala. 1968); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 119, at 85-98; WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 111, at 77-81, 89-90.
138. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). Twenty-three blacks who won county offices
in Mississippi in 1967 found it almost impossible to get bonds, which were necessary for them to
take office, even though, as Charles Evers said, "A lot of poor whites don't even own a chicken,
and they get bonded." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 58-59 & n.173.
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Hindrances to black voters:
(1) Withholding information about registration, voting procedures
or party activities from black voters; 139
(2) giving inadequate or erroneous information to black voters, or
failing to provide assistance to illiterate voters;4 '
(3) omitting the names of registered voters from the lists;,4
(4) maintaining racially segregated voting lists or facilities;'
(5) conducting reregistration or purging the rolls;
4 3
(6) allowing improper challenges of black voters;'44
139. United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 60-64, 74-76.
In 1968, an insurgent group of Democrats unseated the Regular Democratic delegation to the
Democratic National Convention by presenting a case that relied heavily on the Regulars' use of
secret meetings, caucuses, and procedures.
140. See pages 563-65 infra; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 70-74;
WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note I l, at 82-86.
141. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 64-67; WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT, supra note I ll, at 81-82.
In Louisiana, which uses party registration, black voters who appear to vote at the Democratic
Primary frequently find that they have been effectively disfranchised by being listed in the Republi-
can books-a designation which they are told takes 6 months to change.
142. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 119, at 82-84.
143. The difficulty blacks have faced in registering to vote has left its mark. In many places
blacks still are likely to register less easily than whites because of a variety of factors including
the difficulty of traveling to the registrar's office or of getting there during business hours, or simply
because of a hesitation to go through the registration process again. In these circumstances, any
procedure which removes voters and puts the burden on them to restore themselves to the rolls is
likely to have a more adverse effect on blacks than on whites. Many procedures seem to be designed
to take advantage of this factor. A reregistration wipes the books totally clean and requires every
voter to sign up again. South Carolina conducts a reregistration every tenth year. In 1971, just
before Mississippi's state and county elections, Mississippi counties engaged in wholesale reregis-
trations on the flimsy pretext that the registration was necessitated by redistricting. See Letter from
Armand Derfner to Assistant Attorney General David L. Norman, July 2, 1971, reprinted in
Hearings on Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 322-24 (1971). The Justice Department
was criticized strongly for failing to use its power under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act to stop the
reregistrations. See H.R. RaP. No. 71-742, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); WASHINGTON RESEARCH
PROJECT, supra note 111, at 24-29.
A purge is a selective removal of names from the rolls for some cause. See Toney v. White,
348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972). One specific problem, more often faced outside the South, is
the periodic purge in which individuals who have failed to vote during a designated period are
removed from the rolls. This practice, though undoubtedly overbroad, has been upheld by one
federal court in a case in which there was no proof of a racially disparate effect. See Williams v.
Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1972). But see Michigan State UAW Community Action
Program Council v. Austin, 387 Mich. 506, 198 N.W.2d 385 (1972).
144. In most states, any voter can challenge another voter, and activate an administrative
procedure which imposes a burden on the challenged voter to defend his status. Wholesale chal-
lenges have been a favorite tactic in Louisiana, but courts have not been deterred by the claim that
the challenges are private acts not subject to regulation. See Reddix v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 930 (5th
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(7) disqualifying black voters on technical grounds;"'
(8) requiring separate registration for different types of elections;",
(9) failing to provide the same opportunities for absentee ballots to
blacks as to whites;
14 7
(10) moving polling places or establishing them in inconvenient or
intimidating locations;
148
(11) setting elections at inconvenient times; 
14
(12) failing to provide adequate voting facilities in areas of greatly
increased black registration; 5' and
(13) causing or taking advantage of election day irregularities.1 ,
Cir. 1958); United States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), affd sub nom. United States
v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F.
Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965). See generally N. MCMILLAN, supra note 124, at 222-27; M. PRICE,
THE NEGRO AND THE BALLOT IN THE SOUTH 34-46 (Southern Regional Council, 1959). For a
discussion of extensive use of challenges in Georgia see Bernd & Holland, supra note 75, at 487-
94; V. KEY, supra note 43, at 570.
145. See United States v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 254 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.
Ala. 1966); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 76-79.
146. Separate registration for state and federal elections was struck down in Haskins v.
Davis, 253 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Va. 1966). Separate registration for county and city elections existed
until last year in North Carolina, see W. TowE, supra note 125, at 49, and still exists in Mississippi
and much of Florida. In Mississippi, moreover, county registration is a prerequisite for city
registration. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 21-11-1 to -3 (1972).
147. Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 119, at 79-80.
148. See, e.g., Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Davis v. Graham, C.A. No. 16,891
(N.D. Ga., Oct. 2, 1972). In Perkins, the new polling place in the most heavily black ward was
the former city jail, which was tiny and dilapidated, and in which many blacks had been beaten
until the very year of the elections involved. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119,
at 80-82.
149. Holding elections at inconvenient times occurs most frequently when a large group of
blacks or other disfavored voters, such as migrant workers or students, will be gone at a particular
time. See, e.g., Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civil No. 5524 (E.D. Tex., July 14, 1972).
150. Use of cramped, inappropriate sites for polling places in black precincts is common.
Often it is done without the appearance of discriminating simply by failing to move to larger
quarters when the rolls in a given black ward have swelled with new registrants. U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 119, at 80-84.
151. Efforts to manipulate the vote on election day are common, but one variant deserves
mention for its ingenuity. In Tallulah, Louisiana, in 1969, a special election was held for the office
of town marshal after the original election had been set aside in United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp.
46 (W.D. La. 1969). The day before the special election, the white officials assigned to large black
precincts suddenly resigned without explanation, leaving inexperienced black alternates in charge
of those precincts. It was apparent that the white officials hoped the inexperience of their alternates
would lead to errors that might cause the precincts' votes to be thrown out-thus doing by
indirection what they could no longer do directly.
As it happened, the black candidate won in a close election, a black alternate official in one
precinct made an error in certifying his ballots, and there was talk that the defeated white candidate
might challenge the election results. The error was too minor to support a substantial challenge,
however, and the talk never came to anything.
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The difficulties in combatting these techniques are immense. Be-
cause many are not embodied in state law but are of local origin, a single
lawsuit may have little effect on a web of discriminatory practices.
Other techniques are embodied, not in written laws or rules, but in
unwritten practices or ad hoe modifications of written authority. In
these cases, because the evidence generally will not be uniform, it may
be difficult to prove that a given practice even exists or that it has been
applied differently to whites and blacks. Further, many of the practices,
like failing to assist illiterate voters, are not obviously restricted in their
effect to blacks, but are devices to take advantage of "the alleged char-
acteristics of the negro race." It may be difficult merely to prove that
such practices are racially distinctive, let alone to prove that they are
invidiously discriminatory. Finally, all these difficulties are com-
pounded because many of the most discriminatory aspects of our elec-
tion process and laws originated as "good government" reforms.1 12 Ex-
Tallulah is something of a testing laboratory for ingenious techniques. See Toney v. White,
348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972); United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969); Brown
v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968). See also Comment, Voting Rights: A Case Study of
Madison Parish, Louisiana, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 726 (1971).
On the other hand, even the most ingenious techniques have ancestors in the 19th century.
Thus, the Tallulah resignation ploy resembled a scheme used in the 1892 Alabama gubernatorial
election, when Democratic inspectors in charge of 6 heavily populist precincts deliberately made
defective returns so as to give the election board an excuse for rejecting them. See Bagwell, The
'Magical Process': The Sayre Election Law of 1893, 25 ALA. REV. 81, 87 (1972).
152. C. DAVIDSON, supra note 123, at 55; T. DYE, THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY 160-61 (1971);
Dixon, Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation,
Community Action, Metroes, and One Man-One Vote, 58 GEo. L.J. 955, 966 (1970); Sloan, Good
Government and the Politics of Race, 17 Soc. PROB. 161, 164, 174 (1969); Sloan & French, Black
Rule in the Urban South?, 9 SOcIETY 29, 34 (1971-72).
Even the Australian ballot "reform" was first introduced in many places in the 1890's with
the intended effect of discriminating against illiterate blacks. Bagwell, supra note 151, at 93-96.
In Arkansas they sang a song about it, to the tune of the Confederate Anthem, "Bonnie Blue Flag:"
The Australian ballot works like a charm,
It makes them think and scratch,
And when a negro gets a ballot
He has certainly got his match.
(Chorus)
Hurrah! Hurrah! for Arkansas Hurrah!
And when we elect Old Grover
We will make them kick and paw.
They go into the booth alone
Their ticket to prepare.
And as soon as five minutes are out
They have got to git from there.
(Chorus)
They then next to the Judge applies
With a little tale of woe,
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amples of these measures include at-large elections, purges and reregis-
trations, and, of course, redistricting. The reformist appearance of these
techniques often renders them immune to attack even when, as in ra-
cially gerrymandered redistricting, the claim of reform is simply a false
cover for perverting the election process.
V. SOURCES OF LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST THE NEW DISCRIMINA-
TION
Unlike attempts of earlier days, recent attacks on these new, elusive
modes of discrimination have been moderately successful because the
courts have been attentive and because the attacks skillfully have mar-
shalled a range of sources of legal protection.
Formerly, the fifteenth amendment and several federal criminal
statutes remaining from Reconstruction were the primary sources of
protection; in the past decade, however, the criminal statutes have gone
virtually unused, and the fifteenth amendment has also been relatively
inactive except as a source of congressional power, largely because of
the difficulty in proving that a given "denial or abridgement" of the
right to vote is on account of race. Instead, the principal sources of
contemporary legal protection against discrimination have been recently
adopted statutes or newly applied constitutional provisions including:
the equal protection clause and due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment; the twenty-fourth amendment, which bans poll taxes in
federal elections; section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which suspends
literacy tests; section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires pre-
clearance of voting changes in covered states; and several provisions of
the recent Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts designed to meet specific
forms of discrimination. Finally, effective use of these sources of protec-
tion has been enhanced by the development of a number of judicial
remedies suitable for particular cases.
The development of the various sources of legal protection against
voting discrimination, and the expansion of their coverage to fill gaps
between them, has increasingly tended to federalize the right to vote."'
The components of a potentially comprehensive defense against voting
discrimination are available, and the question is how creatively they will
And of course his ticket is well prepared,
Which someone is bound to know.
(Chorus)
Graves, supra note 38, at 212-13.
153. R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROcEss 251-82 (1970);
Sentell, Federalizing Through the Franchise: The Supreme Court and Local Government, 6 GA.
L. REv. 34 (1971).
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be used. This section of this Article will touch briefly on these antidiscri-
mination provisions and describe how they have been used to help
"nullif[y] sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimina-
tion."
A. The Fifteenth Amendment
Apart from the power it gives Congress the fifteenth amendment
always has been of limited direct utility because its application depends
upon both proof of discrimination and proof that the discrimination is
along racial lines. Early applications of this amendment were limited to
cases in which the racial distinction was more or less explicit and in
which it could be said that a particular measure had both the purpose
and effect of discriminating on account of race. Under these standards,
which were never quite articulated, the Supreme Court has applied the
fifteenth amendment to strike down discriminatory measures in only
eight cases in a century.154
In recent years, however, the requirements of proof appear to be
less stringent, and the amendment now seems available to strike down
measures or practices that draw disadvantageous distinctions between
blacks and whites. This development may be traceable to a noted
Supreme Court case decided under the fifteenth amendment, Gomillion
v. Lightfoot.' Gomillion, whose result is more obvious than its reason-
ing, held that it was unconstitutional for Tuskegee, Alabama, to redraw
its boundaries to exclude all but four or five black voters while retaining
every single white within the city. The opinion's language makes it
unclear whether the Court's principal ground for holding the city's
boundary change unconstitutional was its purpose or its effect, but re-
cent Supreme Court cases have opted to explain Gomillion as a case
involving racially discriminatory effect.
1 56
154. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915);,Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
155. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
156. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968). See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1210, 1221-22, 1250-54, 1268-69 (1970). Gomillion is also difficult
because it sounds like a fourteenth amendment case although it purports to rest on the fifteenth.
It may be that the choice of the fifteenth amendment was dictated, for some Justices at least, by
the fear that a fourteenth amendment holding might lead to overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549 (1946), which had held malapportionment nonjusticiable. Since Colegrove was a four-
teenth amendment case, resting Gomillion on the fifteenth amendment enabled Justice Frankfurter
to write that Gomillion was an entirely different case because the racial claim lifted it out of the
political arena that the Court had refused to enter in Colegrove.
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Under the modern interpretation of the equal protection clause,
virtually any showing of denial or abridgment of the right to vote on
account of race-a violation of the fifteenth amendment-also consti-
tutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws.157 Because a fourteenth
amendment violation can be shown without proving that a distinction
is along racial lines, litigants tend to use the fourteenth amendment
rationale when there is a choice.
The fifteenth amendment is used commonly, however, in cases
involving ad hoc administrative practices."8 Here, the fifteenth amend-
ment usually is applied in conjunction with one of the implementing
statutes that bar racial voting discrimination committed under "any
constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation," or by means of any
"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure ... "I In the past few years, federal courts, relying on one
In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court holding that Richmond's annexa-
tion of a large number of white suburbanites violated the fifteenth amendment because it was
inteded to eliminate a black majority and thus prevent blacks from winning control of the city
council. Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972). Holt is a troublesome case, but it stands for much less
than it suggests on first reading. The district court had found that the annexation was valid and
necessary, but that the city officials' rush to conclude it before the 1970 elections resulted from
discriminatory motives. The district court upheld the annexation, but ordered the 1970 elections
set aside and reheld under a scheme that minimized the impact of the additional voters. The Fourth
Circuit held simply that the proof and findings did not show the purpose of the annexation was
discriminatory because any discriminatory motives were "remote" from the annexation proceed-
ing, which was being conducted in the Virginia state courts. That proceeding had gone on for many
years without any discriminatory purpose, according to the Fourth Circuit, and the fact that some
city officials at some point perceived it as having advantages in terms of their own prejudices could
not taint the longstanding state court proceeding or poison an otherwise valid and compelling
annexation, that was neither affected nor effected by their prejudices.
There was no discussion of the effect of the annexation, except the broad fact that the
annexation eliminated a black majority and that political lines in the city were drawn generally
along racial lines. The case thus stands for the obverse of Gomillion, i.e. that if the effect of an
act includes substantial neutral or beneficial features, evidence that some people were pleased to
perceive a discriminatory effect will not transform the act into one whose purpose or whose
inescapable effect is discriminatory.
The Fourth Circuit's view of the case may not square with the record, but it does not conflict
with the district court's actual findings. The annexation is presently being challenged uider § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. See note 247 infra.
157. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); see pages 569-75 infra.
158. When the discrimination is not rooted in a statute or regulation, courts may be deterred
from applying the equal protection clause by the puzzling suggestion in Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1, 7 (1944), that an administrative error which misinterprets or distorts valid state law is not
a denial of the "equal protection of the laws" unless there is some design or intention to discrimi-
nate, or unless a suspect classification results. See discussion at note 200 infra.
The fifteenth amendment's prohibition against racial discrimination in voting invites no such
fanciful distinction between statutory and administrative discriminations.
159. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a)(1), 1973 (1970).
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or both of these statutes or on the fifteenth amendment itself, have
required relocation of polling places that were inconvenient for black
voters, 6 ' restored black voters stricken in a racially selective purge and
simultaneously struck fictitious names enrolled in predominantly white
precincts, 6' invalidated a primary election because an official volun-
teered information concerning qualification only to whites-with the
result that black candidates made disqualifying errors, 12 and invalidated
a general election because officials gave opportunities to cast absentee
ballots only to white voters.
6 3
B. Suspension of Literacy Tests
The provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act suspending literacy
tests for five years in certain states'64 have led to numerous cases that
generally have guaranteed the rights of voters who need assistance.
Many of these decisions have rested upon the illiterate voter's rights
under the equal protection clause.
Under section 4(a) of the 1965 Act, a state or subdivision in which
literacy tests have been suspended may reinstate its tests and otherwise
terminate the Act's special coverage provisions before termination of
the statutory five-year-now ten-year-period upon a showing that the
test it had used before 1965 was not racially discriminatory in purpose
or effect. In 1967, Gaston County, North Carolina, sought to terminate
coverage by proving that the test it used from 1962 until its suspension
in 1965 was not discriminatory. Although it was undisputed that the test
had been fairly applied, the Supreme Court rejected this claim by hold-
ing that Gaston County's past systematic deprivation of equal
educational opportunities left its blacks unequally prepared to meet
literacy requirements; thus, even a fair test would have a discriminatory
effect. ' As one commentator has noted, this was the "fruition of the
freezing principle."'6
Once the Act enfranchised illiterates in certain states, problems
arose with voting procedures. At least two states, Louisiana and Missis-
160. Davis v. Graham, Civil No. 16,891 (N.D. Ga., Oct. 2, 1972).
161. Hatcher v. Krupa, Civil No. 4806 (N.D. Ind., Nov. 6, 1971).
162. United States v. Democratic Executive Comm., Civil No. 6047-70 (S.D. Ala., Dec. 22,
1970).
163. Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968).
164. See note 111 supra.
165. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1969), affg 288 F. Supp. 678
(D.D.C. 1968).
166. Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup.
CT. REV. 379.
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sippi, recently had repealed longstanding statutes providing for assis-
tance to illiterate voters, presumably those qualified under the under-
standing test or other alternatives designed in the 1890's for illiterate
white voters. In both states, the repeals were undone by federal court
orders which required election officials to give, upon the request of any
voter, any "reasonable assistance as may be necessary to permit such
voter to cast his ballot in accordance with the voter's own decision. 1 67
As Judge Wisdom said in explaining this order in United States v.
Louisiana:
This stultifying provision [barring assistance to illiterates] conflicts with the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. The Act provides for the suspension of literacy tests in states
which have used such tests as a discriminatory device to prevent Negroes from
registering to vote. Like any other law, this provision implicitly carries with it all
means necessary and proper to carry out effectively the purposes of the law. As
Louisiana recognized for 150 years, if an illiterate is entitled to vote, he is entitled
to assistance at the polls that will make his vote meaningful. We cannot impute to
Congress the self-defeating notion that an illiterate has the right [to] pull the lever
of a voting machine, but not the right to know for whom he pulls the lever.'6'
This view was implicit in striking down other discrimination
against illiterates, including a Georgia provision limiting private citi-
zens-allowed by statute to provide voter assistance-to assisting no
more than one voter each, 69 and a Greene County, Alabama, rule bar-
ring illiterates, but not literates, from carrying marked sample ballots
into the voting booth.17 On the other hand, courts refused to order
Virginia to allow illiterates to paste premarked gummed stickers on
their ballots,' 7 1 and refused to hold that Sunflower, Mississippi, had
167. United States v. Mississippi, 256 F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. Miss. 1966); see United States
v. Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 703, 709 (E.D. La. 1966), affd mem., 386 U.S. 270 (1967).
168. 265 F. Supp. at 708.
169. Morris v. Fortson, 261 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ga. 1966). The Georgia statute had allowed
a person to assist 10 voters before a recent amendment lowered the limit to one voter. The court
ordered the 10-voter limit reinstated.
170. Gilmore v. Greene County Democratic Party Executive Comm., 435 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1970).
171. After its literacy test was suspended, Virginia adopted new balloting regulations provid-
ing, that election officials, who were already empowered to assist disabled voters, could also assist
illiterate voters. A district court held that the voter's constitutional rights had not been violated
by the failure to permit the use of stickers as an alternative to receiving aid from an official. Allen
v. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Va. 1967). After the Supreme Court determined
that the new procedure was covered by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, id., 393 U.S. 544 (1969), a
statute incorporating the new procedure was enacted and was cleared by the Attorney General
under the Voting Rights Act. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard to Virginia
Attorney General Robert Y. Button, -, 1969. The question of an alternative to assistance
from an official is no small issue. The chilling effect on a black illiterate voter of being assisted by
a white election official can be significant. The black voter faces the prospect of revealing his vote
to an unfamiliar or hostile white person without having any assurance that his vote will be cast as
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provided inadequate assistance simply because the assisting officials
were all white.
7 2
The rationale of United States v. Louisiana has been extended to
states that do not have formal literacy tests. Texas, for example, had
no formal literacy test but prohibited any assistance from being given
to illiterates. In ordering Texas to assist illiterate voters, 173 a district
court found that withholding aid to illiterates denied them equal protec-
tion since blind and disabled voters were entitled to aid under Texas law.
Finally, section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which enfranchised
Puerto Ricans literate only in Spanish, 174 was the basis for a Chicago
decision in which election officials were ordered to provide ballots and
instructional materials in Spanish when necessary.
1 75
The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1970. In addition to extend-
ing the suspension of tests in covered areas to ten years or at least until
1975, the amendments then included a provision that suspended all
literacy tests in other states until 1975 without triggering any special
coverage provisions.7 ' In Oregon v. Mitchell, Congress' power to sus-
he directs. Faced with this prospect, many illiterate voters have forfeited their votes by staying
home or by spoiling their ballots in vain attempts to cast them without assistance.
172. Hamer v. Ely, 410 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 942 (1969).
173. Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970), remanded, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.
1971), injunction granted, Civ. No. SA 70-CA-169 (W.D. Tex., Dec. 6, 1971).
174. Section 4(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970), suspends English literacy requirements for
anyone who has completed the sixth grade in a public school or an accredited private school within
the United States, Puerto Rico, or any territory, in which the predominant classroom language is
a language other than English. This provision was upheld as appropriate legislation under the
fourteenth amendment by Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
The recognition in Morgan of a degree of congressional power to define the content of the
equal protection clause has caused some alarm because it seems to lend constitutional support to
legislation restricting constitutional rights as they have been defined by the federal courts. Burt,
Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81; Note, The Nixon Busing
Bills and Congressional Power, 81 YALE L.J. 1542, 1560-73 (1972). See also Bickel, The Voting
Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 95-102. A note to the Morgan opinion seeks to avoid this
possibility by saying simply that Congress can only enforce, not dilute, the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10, yet the commentators are correct in saying that this
simple statement raises more questions than it answers.
At the same time it decided Morgan, the Supreme Court refused to rule on a claim that the
fourteenth amendment per se requires a state's literacy requirement to be satisfied by Spanish
literacy. Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966). The California Supreme Court subsequently
upheld that claim and struck down that state's English literacy requirement as applied to people
literate in Spanish. Castro v. State, 3 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
175. Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1970). The 1970 amendment also provided that 18-year olds
should vote, 42 U.S.C. 1973bb-1 (1970), and adopted new rules for voting for the President and
Vice President, including the right to register and vote absentee and a ban on state residency
requirements (for those elections) of more than 30 days. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970).
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pend tests nationwide was unanimously upheld. 17 Every Justice agreed
that Congress could use a broad remedy for a widespread problem, even
though literacy tests in some areas might not, in fact, be discriminatory.
While affirming Congress' power under the fifteenth amendment
to bar literacy tests, the Court nevertheless has reaffirmed its earlier
holding that literacy tests per se do not violate the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendment. 178 Thus, although the suspension of literacy tests generally
has been acclaimed throughout the nation and few could desire their
return, the problem is not permanently solved. Because literacy tests are
not barred by any self-enforcing provision of the Constitution, unless the
nineteen literacy test states repeal their tests, Congress must renew the
statutory suspension, enact a permanent prohibition by 1975, or see the
tests return.
C. Anti-Poll Tax Provisions
Although Congress has dealt more circumspectly with the poll tax,
that requirement is now wholly eliminated, probably because of its in-
herent irrationality. Its elimination has led also to the invalidation of
related tests that discriminate against black and poor candidates. De-
spite the increasing recognition of the evils of the poll tax in the past
third of a century it took 25 years of concerted effort before the federal
government took the first limited step, the passage of the 24th amend-
ment guaranteeing the unqualified right to vote in federal elections
without payment of a poll tax or any other tax.179
After the enactment of the twenty-fourth amendment, several of
the five remaining states with poll taxes' adopted new laws designed
to keep the offensive features of the tax in effect by imposing substitute
requirements. In Virginia, for example, one could pay the poll tax and
be eligible to vote in state and federal elections. However, if he wished
to exercise his twenty-fourth amendment right to avoid the poll tax, he
had to obtain a special certificate, which allowed him to vote in federal,
but not state, elections. In striking down this statute, the Supreme Court
in Harman v. Forssenius81 noted that, although a money payment was
177. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
178. Several of the opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell approvingly cited Lassiter v. Northamp-
ton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See, e.g., 400 U.S. at 144 (Douglas, J.); id. at
232 (Brennan, J.); id. at 283 (Stewart, J.).
179. Congressional pressure began after the Supreme Court upheld the poll tax in Breedlove
v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). A direct fifteenth amendment attack on the poll tax was rejected
in Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17 (E.D. Va.), aff d, 341 U.S. 937 (1951).
180. The 5 states with poll taxes in 1964 were Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, and
Vermont.
181. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
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not required, the voter choosing to obtain his federal election certificate
still faced two of the most objectionable features of the poll tax: the
certificate had to be obtained annually and at least six months before
the election.1 12 The Supreme Court held that this requirement was a
material imposition upon a voter in exercising his twenty-fourth amend-
ment rights and that it therefore abridged those rights regardless of
whether the new requirement was harder or easier than the poll tax it
replaced." 3
In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress moved against the poll
tax as a prerequisite to voting in nonfederal elections, but stopped short
of outlawing or suspending it. Instead, in section 10, Congress stated
that the poll tax discriminated against the poor and, in some places,
blacks, and that it did not "bear a reasonable relationship to any legiti-
mate State interest in the conduct of elections . . . ." Accordingly, the
Attorney General was directed to sue to invalidate the poll tax as a
precondition to voting." 4
The Attorney General thereafter filed suits in Virginia, Mississippi,
Texas, and Alabama-the only four states maintaining these taxes. At
the same time, a private lawsuit that attacked the Virginia poll tax was
proceeding to the Supreme Court. The poll tax was struck down in three
of the cases during the months of February and March, 1966, by district
courts in United States v. Texas'85 and United States v. Alabama,8 ' and
by the Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections187
Although these three decisions ironically relied on different constitu-
tional provisions, the tax's irrelevance to the voting process was at the
core of each opinion. In the Texas case, the district court held that the
imposition of an unnecessary tax on the right to vote violated due pro-
cess. In the Alabama decision, a majority of the court held that the tax
retained its original purpose of disfranchising blacks and therefore vio-
182. The disfranchising effect of the poll tax resulted as much from the early payment
deadline and the need to keep the receipt as it did from the cost. It was "like buying a ticket to a
show nine months ahead of time, and before you know who is playing or really what the thing is
all about. It is easy to forget to do." Stoney, Suffrage in the South, Part !, the Poll Tax, 29 SuRVEY
GRAPHIC 4, 8-9 (1940), quoted in A. KIRWAN, supra note 38, at 75.
183. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965). Mississippi's evasion was struck down in
Gray v. Johnson, 234 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1973h(a) (1970). The statute also provided that while the Attorney Gen-
eral's suits were pending a voter could not be barred if he tendered payment of the current year's
poll tax within 45 days of the election in which he sought to vote. Id. § 1973h(d).
185. 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
186. 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966).




lated the fifteenth amendment. In Harper, the Supreme Court held that:
"To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor," in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.
188
Since the elimination of the poll tax, the principles employed in
these cases have been used effectively against other forms of taxing the
right to vote, such as imposing property qualifications upon the right
to vote189 or the right to hold office."' Moreover, in 1972, the Supreme
Court cited Harper extensively in holding that the equal protection
clause bars the imposition of high filing fees for candidates.'"
D. Other Civil Rights Statutes
In the civil rights acts passed since 1957, Congress set forth sub-
stantive regulations governing the right to vote, several of which may
apply without a finding that a previous practice was done on account
of race.
One of the most significant is section 11(a) of the Voting Rights
Act, 1 2 which provides that: "No person acting under color of law shall
fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under
any provision of this subchapter or is otherwise qualified to vote, or
willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such person's vote."
Decisions under this section have invalidated a general election in which
voters were not informed that pulling the straight party lever would not
register a vote for the leading black candidate;' required the counting
of votes that had been rejected for technical failure to comply with state
law; 4 and invalidated a primary election in which certain voters,
most but not all of whom were black, had been removed from the rolls
by improper challenges immediately before the election. 95
Two other important sections do not require acts based upon race.
188. Id. at 668. Judgments were entered the following week in United States v. Missis-
sippi, II RACE REL. L. REP. 837 (S.D. Miss. 1966), and United States v. Virginia, 11 RACE REL.
L. REP. 853 (E.D. Va. 1966).
189. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
190. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Stapleton v. Clerk for the City of Inkster, 311
F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
191. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(a) (1970). But see Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970)
(suggesting that a § 1 (a) case must at least have a racial overtone).
193. United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969).
194. United States v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 254 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.
Ala. 1966).
195. Toney v. White, 348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. La. 1972).
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The first requires officials to apply one set of standards in determining
the qualifications of all voters-essentially codifying the equal protec-
tion clause."' The second prohibits officials from denying anyone the
right to vote because of immaterial errors in applications or other prere-
quisites.'97
E. The Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has long
been available to strike down explicitly racial voting discrimination. It
was so used in the first two white primary cases. 9 ' In this context,
however, the fourteenth amendment adds little to the protections af-
forded black voters by the fifteenth amendment."9 It was not until the
early 1960's-when the equal protection clause began to be used to
invalidate voting discriminations not explicitly based on race-that the
clause took on added value for blacks as well as other voters. Two
concepts, which concerned the application of the equal protection clause
and which developed during this recent period, have added to its impor-
tance: (1) that diluting votes is akin to disfranchisement; and (2) that
all restrictions on the right to vote should be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Before the 1960's, the equal protection clause lay dormant as a
source of voter protection, °0 but in 1962 the Supreme Court in Baker
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(A) (1970).
197. Id. § 1971(a)(2)(B). Both sections together have been used to restore a black candi-
date's name to the ballot after he was disqualified because his nominating petitions contained an
error similar to one made by a white candidate who was not disqualified. United States v. Board
of Election Comm'rs, Civil No. WC7153-K (N.D. Miss., Oct. 27, 1971).
198. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1972); see Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932).
199. See. e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895 (1955).
200. Several decisions have suggested that the equal protection clause could not be used to
protect voting rights. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1 (1944).
These cases gave the impression that the fourteenth amendment did not cover "political"
rights, as Justice Harlan was later to suggest repeatedly, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
163 (1970). That impression was wholly at odds with the prior cases, especially with regard to the
equal protection clause. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Before 1962 the
Supreme Court had only twice used the equal protection clause to strike down restrictions on
voting-in the 2 Nixon cases involving state-decreed white primaries-but the first Nixon case had
squarely addressed and rejected the argument that political rights were not within the equal
protection clause:
"The objection that the subject-matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon
words. Of course the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private
damage. . ..
".. . We find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us
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v. Carr applied the equal protection clause to the dilution of votes
resulting from malapportionment.20 1 After several more dilution
cases,0 2 in 1965 the Court for the first time applied the equal protection
clause to a voter qualification not explicitly drawn on racial lines. That
case, Carrington v. Rash,213 struck down a Texas constitutional provi-
sion prohibiting servicemen from acquiring voting residence in the state.
In holding the Texas provision to be a denial of equal protection,
the Supreme Court in Carrington noted that the right to vote which
"this Court has been so zealous to protect" is "close to the core of our
constitutional system. 204 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court anal-
ogized voting to free speech 2 1 and emphasized that the right to vote is
"a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights. 2 16
Accordingly, the Court insisted that restrictions on voting require "close
scrutiny," that they may not be overbroad, and that any justifying state
interest must be not only rational, but also compelling. 27 No matter
how the test for compliance with the equal protection clause is phrased,
it produces the same result: a presumption favoring the right to cast
effective ballots, a pro tanto shift of the burden of justifying the restric-
tion to the state, and a skeptical view of any justifications advanced by
the state. This shift in attitude pervades all the voting decisions, not
simply those involving bars or inconveniences to voters or candidates.
hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth." Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927).
Moreover, the applicability of the equal protection clause to voting rights was recognized in
numerous other cases in which the claim of denial of equal protection was rejected on the merits.
E.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); Pope v. Williams,
193 U.S. 621, 634 (1904), overruled, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams v. Missis-
sippi, 170 U.S. 213, 219 (1898).
201. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
202. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
203. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
204. Id. at 96.
205. E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364
(1969); Toporek v. South Carolina Election Comm'n, Civ. No. 72-1225 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 1973).
206. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
207. "[I]t is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any statute which
'places a condition on the exercise of the right to vote.' Bullock v. Carter, [405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972)]. This development in the law culiminated in Kramer v. Union Free School District, [395
U.S. 621 (1969)]. There we canvassed in detail the reasons for strict review of statutes distributing
the franchise, [id. at 626-630], noting inter alia that such statutes 'constitute the foundation of our
representative society.' We concluded that if a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some
citizens and denies the franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are
necessary to promote a compelling state interest.' [id., at 627]; Cipriano v. City of Houma, [395
U.S. 701, 704 (1969)], Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, [399 U.S. 204, 205, 209 (1970)]. Cf. Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, [383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)]." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
337 (1972).
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The most common use of the compelling interest test has been in
cases involving eligibility to vote or restrictions that effectively deny the
vote to different categories of people.0 8 This test also has been used
explicitly in cases involving the rights of candidates and political par-
ties,"0 9 as well as implicitly in other cases that have concerned significant
restrictions on the right to cast an effective ballot. The latter cases are
typified by the failure to give aid or giving inadequate aid to illiterates, 10
requiring registration too far in advance of an election,"' singling out
categories of people for more stringent application of residence require-
ments or purging standards, 12 disqualifying voters for criminal convic-
tions,213 and favoring certain candidates or parties in arranging the
order of candidates on the ballot.
21 4
In the most recent cases the discriminatory nature of the practices
that have been struck down has been quite subtle, either because there
is no official distinction drawn-as with the early registration deadline,
where the voter has the power to avoid the harmful effect simply by
registering-or, when there is a distinction, because it is not evident that
anyone is disadvantaged thereby. Differences like these, which impose
208. It has been used, for example, in cases in which the following groups of people were
disfranchised: servicemen, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); nonproperty owners, Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); nonparents, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969); poor people, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); residents of a
federal enclave, Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); new residents, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972); and most recently unconvicted jail inmates, Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
209. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
210. E.g., Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
211. E.g., Ferguson v. Williams, 343 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Miss. 1972) ("[T]he state may not,
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, justify a longer registration period [than is clearly
essential to hold orderly elections] by the use of part-time, ill-paid election officials, assisted only
by limited staff, or by adhering to slow-moving election machinery adequate in other times.");
Beare v. Smith, 321 F.2d 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also Bishop v. Lomenzo, 350 F. Supp. 576,
587 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The remedy lies in providing more clerks rather than in registering fewer
voters.").
212. E.g., Newburger v. Peterson, 334 F. Supp. 559 (D.N.H. 1972); Whatley v. Clark, C.A.
No. 5474 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 1972).
213. E.g., Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1972) (ordering 3-judge court
convened to test statute disqualifying unpardoned felons); Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182
(D.N.J. 1970). But see Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1048 (1968); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
Disqualification for felony, like the poll tax, is an ancient tradition, but it has often been used to
discriminate against blacks, as several Southern states did in the post-Reconstruction period by
adding crimes like petit larceny to the list of disqualifying crimes. See Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss.
247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 867 (1896).
214. Compare Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F.
Supp. 1280 (N.D. III. 1972); Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261, (N.D. I11. 1960), with Bohus v.
Board of Election Comm'n, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Mexican-American Political
Ass'n v. Brown, No. SAC, 7951 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 26, 1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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on state election officials an obligation to eliminate the possibility
of discrimination, represent a new use of the equal protection clause,
and have not gone unchallenged.2 15 These cases are also closely related
to other recent cases that deal with vote dilution, and the overlapping
of the two concepts may be of the utmost importance to black voters.
The early dilution cases generally involved equalizing district popu-
lations without regard to race.216 For blacks, cases of this sort ordinarily
have brought little benefit. In the past few years, however, there has
been increasing recognition that black votes can be diluted in very so-
phisticated ways, and courts have indicated that claims of discrimina-
tion arising from seemingly neutral election systems that draw no dis-
tinctions on their face are cognizable at least if race is involved. Because
racial gerrymandering, even if cognizable, is extraordinarily difficult to
prove, there has been little progress in challenging districting plans using
single-member districts.217 On the other hand, although the proof is
215. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 93 S.Ct. 1245
(Mar. 21, 1973); Marston v. Lewis, 93 S.Ct. 1211 (Mar. 21, 1973).
A number of studies have shown how illusory the appearance of neutrality can be. R. KIMBALL,
THE DISCONNECTED (1972); Kelley, Ayres & Bowen, Registration and Voting: Putting First Things
First, 67 AMER. POL. Sc. REv. 359, 375 (1967) ("[o]ur study indicates, not only that electorates
are much more the product of political forces than many have appreciated, but also that, to a
considerable extent, they can be political artifacts. Within limits, they can be constructed to a size
and composition deemed desirable by those in power.").
216. E.g., Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (special-purpose bodies, e.g.,
school districts); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (local governmental bodies);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislative elections); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1 (1964) (congressional elections); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (gubernatorial election).
The one-man-one-vote rule has been held inapplicable in some situations. E.g., Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Conservation Dist., 93 S. Ct. 1224 (1973) (certain special-purpose
bodies, e.g., water districts); Wells v. Edwards, 93 S. Ct. 904 (mem.) (1973) (elected judges); Sailors
v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) (quasi-appointive body performing primarily administrative
duties). See generally R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION (1968).
The only major case that was different was Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). In Moore,
the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute requiring petitions from 50 of the state's 102
counties to nominate an independent candidate. The Court held that the statute discriminated
against residents of large counties. Unlike the ordinary reapportionment case, in which residents
of different size districts compete with each other through their legislators, the favored citizens in
Moore did not gain at the direct expense of the disfavored citizens.
217. The difficulties of proving a racial gerrymander are shown by Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52 (1964); Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1972);
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 734-35 (W.D. Tex. 1972). On the other hand, a start has been
made at fashioning techniques for proving a gerrymander. Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972); Klahr v. Williams, 339 F. Supp. 992 (D. Ariz.
1972); Moore v. Leflore County Bd. of Supervisors, C.A. No. GC7184-K (N.D. Miss., Dec. 20,
1972). See also the provocative opinion in Taylor v. MeKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
Black voters have fared better in redistricting cases in those states covered by the Voting
Rights Act. In these states, the requirement that voting changes be approved by the Attorney
General has led this official to develop standards, which have resulted in invalidating all or part of
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almost as difficult, there has been some progress in attacking multi-
member districts, as well as those procedures-such as full-state laws
and numbered place systems-that aggravate a multi-member district
plan. 218
The discriminatory potential of multi-member districts has been
recognized since 1966, when the Supreme Court said:
Where the [equal population] requirements of Reynolds v. Sims are met, appor-
tionment schemes including multi-member districts will constitute an invidious
discrimination only if it can be shown that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-
member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particu-
lar case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population .
2 1
Earlier, a district court had invalidated an Alabama reapportion-
ment scheme on the ground that the combination of white majority and
black majority counties showed a clear purpose to discriminate against
black voters by submerging them in white majority, at-large districts.
22
Apart from this case and several others that struck down patently racist
attempts by Deep South counties to shift from district elections to at-
large elections, 221 the dismantling of at-large elections on the grounds
of diluting black votes remained a theoretical proposition.
In 1969, an Indiana district court held that at-large elections in
Marion County diluted black votes in the city of Indianapolis.22 2 In
1971, however, this judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court in
Whitcomb v. Chavis, in which the Court found that the failure of Mar-
ion County's blacks to achieve greater electoral success appeared to be
about 50 redistricting plans for state legislatures and local governmental units, such as cities,
counties, and school boards. See S. Halpin & R. Engstrom, Racial Gerrymandering and Southern
State Legislative Redistricting: Attorney General Determinations Under the Voting Rights Act
(paper presented to Southern Political Science Association, November 2-4, 1972); note 245 infra.
Black participation in redistricting cases can produce substantial gains even when the issue is
not drawn in terms of racial gerrymanders. Redistricting cases are typically multisided lawsuits in
which the pull and tug among parties has a significant effect on the end result, and black voters
can often gain significantly in this process. For example, in David v. Cahill, 342 F. Supp. 463
(D.N.J. 1972), the congressional districting plan adopted by the district court was the one most
favorable to black interests, i.e. it combined all of Newark (previously split among three districts)
and all of East Orange for a district which is already 52% black. This result was achieved on the
basis of proof (presented largely by the black plaintiffs) that the governmental structure of New
Jersey makes the appropriate subunit of government the city, not the county.
218. For a general discussion of recent developments in connection with multimember dis-
tricts see A. Derfner, Multi-Member Districts and Black Voters, 2 BLACK L.J. 120 (1972).
219. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966). The thought was first expressed the
previous year in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
220. Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
221. E.g., Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified, 386 F.2d 979 (5th
Cir. 1967).




a function of losing elections politically rather than of any racial exclu-
sion or submergence."
Although the Whitcomb decision clearly indicated that attacks on
multimember districts would face strong uphill fights, within seven
months, district courts in Louisiana,2 4 Alabama,2 5 and Texas 25 ordered
the dismantling of multimember districts on the ground that they dis-
criminated against blacks. These opinions distinguished Whitcomb by
emphasizing the history of discrimination in their respective states and
the consequent necessity to avoid drawing districts that would perpetu-
ate the discrimination. Although the reasoning of the three opinions is
somewhat different, all concluded that at-large elections discriminate
against blacks whenever there is a history of racial discrimination and
evidence that the history still affects present voting patterns. This con-
clusion probably was best stated in Graves v. Barnes, the Texas district
court opinion in which a multimember district also was found to dis-
criminate against Mexican-Americans: "All these factors confirm the
fact that race is still an important issue in Bexar County and that
because of it, Mexican-Americans are frozen into permanent political
minorities destined for constant defeat at the hands of the controlling
political majorities.2 2 7
The district court in Graves v. Barnes also noted that the use of
the numbered place system and majority requirement were additional
factors rendering the at-large Texas districts even more discrimina-
tory.228 In other recent cases, a South Carolina court has invalidated a
full-slate law;29 and a North Carolina court has struck down both a full-
slate law and a numbered place system.23 These two decisions illustrate
the versatility of the equal protection clause in this area, because both
courts were influenced by evidence of racial overtones in the particular
mechnisms, but based their decisions on a general application of the
equal protection clause. The potential of using the equal protection
clause to attack mechanisms that dilute votes, especially black votes, is
223. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
224. Bussie v. Governor of Louisiana, 333 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. La.), modified, 457 F.2d 796
(5th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972).
225. Sims v. Amos, 336 F. Supp. 924 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
226. Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.), stay denied, 405 U.S. 1201, prob.juris.
noted sub nom. Bullock v. Regester, 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
227. 343 F. Supp. at 732.
228. Id. at 725.
229. Stevenson v. West, Civil No. 72-45 (D.S.C., April 7, 1972). Eight years before, the same
court had upheld a full-slate law. Boineau v. Thornton, 235 F. Supp. 175 (E.D.S.C.), affd, 379
U.S. 15 (1964).
230. Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
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beginning to be realized; but there are conflicting currents, and we
cannot yet know which way the Constitution will be taken.
F. The Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process Clause
A few recent cases have applied the due process clause to voting
problems, and this trend may grow substantially. Statements in various
opinions to the effect that voting is a fundamental right and is related
to the first amendment freedom of association suggest, as held in United
States v. Texas, that "the right to vote is one of the fundamental per-
sonal rights included within the concept of liberty as protected by the
due process clause."2 ' In the Texas case, the due process clause was
held to invalidate the Texas poll tax.
In other recent cases, the due process clause has served to void
unpublished and overly restrictive procedures for challenging the valid-
ity of nominating petition signatures,2 2 and to invalidate procedures
that effectively allowed the major parties to set the deadlines for filing
minor party candidates' nominations.23 In several other cases, unfair
political party procedures apparently were held to violate due pro-
cess. 234 Moreover, a number of decisions appear to use due process
analysis, although their holdings purport to rest on other
grounds-generally the equal protection clause. The equal protection
231. 252 F. Supp. 234, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1966). It does not appear that any case other than
Johnson v. Hood, 430 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1970), has held the due process clause inapplicable to the
right to vote. Johnson, however, relies on Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), and Snowden
dealt not with the right to vote but with the right to be a candidate for state office. The other cases
cited by Johnson are no more helpful.
In any event, it is probable that time has erased the Snowden principle that the right to run
for office is not an aspect of liberty or property. See 321 U.S. at 15 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The expanding concept of liberty in cases like Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), makes it difficult to imagine that "liberty" does not include
a right that is "fundamental, because preservative of all rights," Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). Presumably, federal courts' reluctance to intervene in state
elections will leave the states considerable discretion in establishing the process that is due, but
this has nothing to do with whether the constitutional clause applies. See Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571-75 (1972). For general statements concerning state discretion and due process
see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Compare the suggestion in Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970), that a violation of the
due process clause in an election is contingent upon the absence of an adequate state remedy.
232. Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1970).
233. United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State Election Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 784
(D.S.C. 1970).
234. Miller v. Bartunek, 349 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Foley v. Democratic Executive
Comm., Civil No. 72-935 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 2, 1972). Miller does not state which provision of the
fourteenth amendment forms the basis for its holding. Foley does not rest directly on due process,
but on party rules that it enforces under state law by pendent jurisdiction-yielding virtually the
equivalent of a due process holding.
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clause, however, seems inappropriate in many cases, especially when it
is difficult to define a favored class and a disadvantaged class, or to
ascertain any nexus between two classes.235 On the other hand, use of
the due process clause in these situations permits a finer analysis and
creates a more precise remedy for many aspects of the election process
that now proceed hapazardly and seriously abridge the right to vote.
G. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 3'
Congress has provided a special weapon to combat recently
adopted discriminatory mechanisms. When it passed the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Congress realized that registration gains produced by the
suspension of literacy tests easily could be nullified by new discrimina-
tory mechanisms. 2 7 The congressional reponse to this possibility was
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. This section is an open-ended provi-
sion that requires federal preclearance of any changes in voting proce-
dures by any state or subdivision thereof in which the coverage "trigger"
provisions have operated to suspend literacy tests. Although the suspen-
sion of tests by section 4 always has been the center of attention, the
preclearance requirement in section 5 has surfaced as the truly ingenious
part of the Act.
Under the preclearance requirement, any new voting regula-
tion-"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure with respect to voting"-adopted in a covered state
after November 1, 1964, is automatically suspended. The suspension
will continue until the state or political subdivision obtains a declaratory
judgment from a District of Columbia three-judge court certifying that
the proposed change has no racially discriminatory purpose and will
have no racially discriminatory effect. As a simpler alternative to this
procedure, the state or subdivision may seek preclearance by submitting
the change to the Attorney General, in which case it may enforce the
235. See, e.g., Dunston v. Scott, 336 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1970).
237. "Mr. Katzenbach: The justification for that is simply this: Our experience in the areas
that would be covered by this Bill has been such as to indicate frequently on the part of State
legislatures a desire in a sense to outguess the courts of the United States or even to outguess the
Congress of the United States. I refer, for example, to the new voter qualifications that have been
put into the statutes of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama following the enactment of the 1964
act which made things more difficult for people to vote. ...
"The same thing was true, as the Chairman may recall, in Louisiana at the time of the initial
school desegregation, where the legislature passed I don't now [sic] how many laws in the shortest
period of time. Every time the judge issued a decree, the legislature . . . passed a law to frustrate
that decree." Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1965).
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change unless the Attorney General "objects" within 60 days. In either
case, the burden of proof is no longer on the voter opposing the change;
it shifts to the state or subdivision, which must show that the change is
nondiscriminatory.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbah,3s the Supreme Court noted that
section 5, which suspends state laws, limits the state's litigation to a
single District of Columbia court and places the burden of proof on the
state, "may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power."
Nevertheless, the Court found the provision justified, given the gravity
of the evil at which it was aimed:
Congress knew that some of the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted
to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole
purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court
decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneu-
vers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained
in the Act itself. . . .Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner. 29
The significance of section 5 did not become apparent until 1969,
when the Supreme Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections2 " clearly
stated that this section covers changes that dilute black citizens' votes
as well as simpler devices of disfranchisement. Allen involved four types
of voting changes: first, a statute changing district elections to at-large
elections for Mississippi county governing boards; secondly, a statute
changing from elective to appointive the selection of school superintend-
ents in several Mississippi counties; thirdly, a statute making it more
difficult for independent candidates to run in Mississippi by increasing
the number of required signatures, shortening the time allowed, and
adding other inconvenient requirements; and lastly, a Virginia regula-
tion governing assistance to illiterate voters. The Supreme Court stated
that "Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the
election law of a covered state in even a minor way""'' and held that all
four changes must be submitted for preclearance. Two years later, the
Supreme Court reiterated the broad coverage of section 5 in Perkins v.
Matthews, which held that municipal annexations and new locations for
polling places had to be precleared . 42
The importance of section 5 in combatting voting discrimination
cannot be underestimated. Under its terms, a voting change that is not
precleared may not be enforced. Thus, the Attorney General's refusal
238. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
239. Id. at 335 (footnote omitted).
240. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
241. Id. at 566.
242. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
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to preclear is equivalent to an injunction . 3 As the Act has developed,
an administrative "injunction" is obtained through a speedy administra-
tive procedure-in only one instance has the state or subdivision not
elected to submit the change to the Attorney General in lieu of seeking
a declaratory judgment. The governing standards for the two procedures
are identical: the submitting authority carries the burden of showing
that the change has no discriminatory purpose and will have no discrimi-
natory effect. 4
243. Ordinarily, the filing of a suit before an election in which an uncleared change is
scheduled to be implemented will result in an order barring implementation of the change or, if
the change is to be an integral part of the election, an order postponing or enjoining the election.
Johnson v. West, Civil No. 72-680 (D.S.C., June 14, 1972) (postponing primary elections through-
out South Carolina because of planned use of uncleared numbered post system); Perkins v. Mat-
thews, 301 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 379, on remand, 336 F. Supp. 6 (S.D.
Miss. 1971) (partial new election ordered). See Howell v. Mahan, Civ. No. 105-71-N (E.D. Va.
order of May 24, 1971).
When an election has been held using an uncleared change, the general rule governing the
remedy of new elections applies, i.e. a new election will be ordered if the violation-use of an
uncleared change-might have affected the outcome. See United States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp.
1054 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Cohan, Civil No. 2882 (S.D. Ga., Oct. 29, 1971); Perkins
v. Matthews, 336 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Miss. 1971); note 251 infra. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections,
393 U.S. 544 (1969), a new election was not ordered because this case represented the first
interpretation of a complex statute.
244. 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1972). See Evers v. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 327 F. Supp.
640 (S.D. Miss. 1971). See generally H.R. REP. No. 71-742, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1971).
For the first few years of the Voting Rights Act, there were few submissions and there was
no set procedure for dealing with them. After Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969),
and especially after Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), submissions began flooding in. The
Attorney General began establishing regular procedures, which were published in late 1971. 28
C.F.R. pt. 51 (1972).
Among the significant procedures are the following: (1) the burden of proof is placed squarely
upon the submitting jurisdiction ("If the evidence as to the purpose or effect of the change is
conflicting, and the Attorney General is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he
shall, consistent with the above-described burden of proof applicable in the District Court, enter
an objection and so notify the submitting authority." 28 C.F.R. § 51.19 (1972)); (2) the At-
torney General may request additional information after receiving the initial submission and the
60-day period does not begin running until he has received adequate information to evaluate the
submission. 28 C.F.R. § 51.18 (1972); (3) comments from interested persons supporting or oppos-
ing submissions are welcomed. 28 C.F.R. § 51.12 (1972); (4) a registry of interested persons is
established, and anyone who wishes may be placed on the registry for receipt of a weekly notice
list of submissions received by the Attorney General. 28 C.F.R. § 51.13 (1972); (5) finally, an open
file containing all material relating to each submission (except internal memoranda and investiga-
tive files) is maintained for public use. 28 C.F.R. § 51.26 (1972).
A number of these procedures, specifically the allocation of the burden of proof and the tolling
of the 60-day period pending receipt of an adequate submission, are being challenged by Georgia.
United States v. Georgia, 351 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ga.), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 911 (1972). A
number of other cases have been decided recently, involving jurisdictional aspects or construction
of this complex statute.
One line of cases involves the relationship of § 5 review to judicial review of the same change
under the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment. In Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), the
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The number of submissions and objections has mushroomed since
the Perkins decision in 1971. As of December 31, 1971, with the Act
being in force for less than eight years, there have been nearly 3,000
submissions, and the Attorney General has objected 141 times. 25 The
types of changes most frequently submitted are redistricting, reregistra-
tion and purging, polling place changes, changes in precinct boundaries,
and annexations. The types of changes that usually draw objections are
majority requirements, numbered place systems, redistricting, and at-
large elections. Among the specific changes to which the Attorney Gen-
eral has objected are: the redistricting of both houses of the Louisiana
Legislature; the redistricting of the Georgia House of Representatives;
major annexations by Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia; numbered
Supreme Court said cryptically that § 5 does not apply to federal court decrees. In Johnson v.
West, Civil No. 72-680 (D.S.C., June 14, 1972), a district court construed Connor v. Johnson to
mean that only voting changes devised by federal courts (e.g., court-drawn reapportionment plans)
are excluded from § 5 coverage. In Sheffield v. Itawamba County Bd. of Supervisors, 439 F.2d
35 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit held that, in some circumstances, a federal court using its
equity power can order voting changes which might be technically objectionable under § 5-so
long as there is no possibility of discrimination.
Another line of cases deals with reviewability of § 5 determinations made by the Attorney
General. The right of a submitting jurisdiction to gain a trial de novo in a 3-judge district court
after an objection by the Attorney General has always been clear, but the standards have been set
out only recently in City of Petersburg v. United States, Civil No. 509-72 (D.D.C., Oct. 24, 1972),
off'd, No. 72-865 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1973). The statute provides no right of review in the opposite
situation, i.e. review by a disappointed voter of a decision by the Attorney General not to object
to a change. Two recent cases have found such a right under the Administrative Procedure Act,
while another recent case has rejected that claim. Compare Harper v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 1607-
72 (D.D.C., Aug. I1, 1972), and Perkins v. Kleindienst, Civil No. 1309-72 (D.D.C., Nov. 2, 1972)
(review available), with Common Cause v. Mitchell, Civil No. 2348-71 (D.D.C., Mar. 30, 1972)
(review denied).
245. The totals are as follows:
Type of Change No. Submitted Objections
Redistricting 354 47
At-Large Elections 46 9
Reregistrations, Purges 50 1
Polling Place Changes 358 8
Precinct Boundaries 274 4
Majority Requirements 24 10
Numbered Place Systems 29 17
Annexations 599 4
Total of All Covered Changes 2787 141*
*The total of 141 objections includes 16 objections to changes that constitute tests or devices. Letter
from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Armand Derfner,
March 16, 1973.
Section 5 enforcement has been studied in detail. See Hearings on the Enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm.,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971); WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT, note 111 supra.
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place systems for the state House of Representatives and local offices
in South Carolina; a Mississippi enabling statute authorizing counties
to shift from district to at-large elections; and an Alabama statute
increasing the requirements for qualification as an independent candi-
date. 46
As an administrative substitute for lawsuits and injunctions, section
5 has provided several enormous benefits wholly apart from the time
and money saved by avoiding litigation. First, the shifting of the burden
of proof in section 5 has resulted in objections to many changes that
could not have been judicially enjoined because the burden of proving
discrimination could not be met.247 Secondly, an awareness of the pre-
clearance requirement has had the in terrorem effect of preventing state
246. Section 5 objections by the Attorney General are not reported. They take the form of
letters from the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division to the law officer of the
submitting authority and are kept on file at the Civil Rights Division of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.
For examples cited in text see Letter from Assistant Attorney General David L. Norman to
Louisiana Attorney General Jack Gremillion, August 20, 1971; Letter from David L. Norman to
Georgia Attorney General Arthur K. Bolton, March 3, 1972; Letter from David L. Norman to
Richmond City Attorney Conard B. Mattox, May 7, 1971; Letter from David L. Norman to
Petersburg City Attorney John Davenport, February 22, 1972; Letter from David L. Norman to
South Carolina Attorney General Daniel R. McLeod, June 30, 1972; Letter from Assistant Attor-
ney General Jerris Leonard to Mississippi Attorney General A. F. Summer, May 21, 1969; Letter
from David L. Norman to Alabama Attorney General William Baxley, August 14, 1972.
Two cases have been decided by the 3-judge district court for the District of Columbia. In
the first case, Petersburg, Virginia, sought to annex a suburban white area-an annexation that
would have eliminated a black population majority within the city. The Attorney General entered
a § 5 objection on the ground that this change would be discriminatory in the context of the city's
at-large council elections. As § 5 allows, Petersburg sued for a declaratory judgment that the
change was not discriminatory in purpose or effect. Although the declaratory judgment action was
a trial de novo, Petersburg in effect appealed the Attorney General's objection. The district court,
however, agreed with the Attorney General and declined to grant the judgment sought as long as
the city retained its at-large elections. City of Petersburg v. United States, Civil No. 509-72
(D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1972), aff'd, No. 72-865 (U.S., Mar. 5, 1973).
In the other case, the Alabama Democratic Party sought a declaratory judgment certifying
that its new rules for selecting delegates to the national convention were not discriminatory. The
change was not submitted in the first instance to the Attorney General. The declaratory judgment
was granted with the Attorney General's acquiescence. Vance v. United States, Civil No. 1529-72
(D.D.C., Nov. 30, 1972). See Maguire v. Amos, 343 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
247. The effect of this shifting of the burden of proof is being tested directly in City of
Richmond v. United States, Civil No. 1718-72 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 25, 1972), a pending case
involving the elimination of a black population majority by the annexation of a large white
suburban area. As in the Petersburg case, the Attorney General entered a § 5 objection on the
ground that the annexation, in the context of at-large elections, was discriminatory. In Richmond,
however, another federal court already has held that the annexation in question did not violate the
fifteenth amendment. Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
931 (1972). The pending lawsuit will, therefore, determine to what extent the shifted burden of
proof gives § 5 a broader sweep than the fifteenth amendment.
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and local governments from attempting certain tactics that officials
know to be objectionable. Finally, a concentration of responsibility in
one office has enabled the Justice Department to acquire an expertise
in this area that aids in judging the discriminatory nature of certain
voting practices. The best example of this factor involves numbered
place systems and majority requirements. Courts have only recently
begun to recognize the highly discriminatory nature of these two
mechanisms, but the Justice Department previously identified them as
typical vehicles of discrimination and therefore objected to the bulk of
these submitted changes. Not only have dozens of these discriminatory
mechanisms consequently been eliminated, but a new body of law also
is developing that assists in fighting these mechanisms in other forums.
H. Judicial Remedies for Voting Discrimination
In the course of developing a body of law on voting discrimination,
the courts have produced a varied set of effective remedies for viola-
tions. Their availability adds an important dimension to the battle
against voting discrimination. Pre-election remedies have included add-
ing candidates to the ballot,28 allowing voters to cast provisional bal-
lots, 49 and postponing or enjoining elections.25 Courts also have devel-
oped the critical postelection remedy of setting aside the results of an
election-or the equivalent remedy of shortening the terms of those
elected-and ordering a new election.2 11
248. E.g., Davis v. Adams, 400 U.S. 1203 (1970); Fowler v. Adams, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970);
Matthews v. Little, 396 U.S. 1223 (1969); Toporek v. South Carolina State Election Comm'n, Civil
No. 72-1225 (D.S.C., Jan. 23, 1973); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
249. Ferguson v. Williams, No. A-297 (Sept. 24, 1971) (Brennan, J.); Vinik v. Smyth, No.
A-314 (Sept. 20, 1971) (Stewart, J.).
Courts have ordered that specific voters be allowed to cast ballots, West v. Kusper, Civil No.
72-C-2805 (N.D. II1., Nov. 7, 1972), and that the polls be kept open late on election day because
of irregularities or confusion. Jaicks v. Mihaly, Civil No. C-72-1042 (N.D. Cal., June 6, 1972);
Coyne v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, Civil No. C-72-434 (N.D. Ohio, May 2, 1972).
250. For orders postponing elections see cases cited note 243 supra. For orders enjoining
elections see Ellis v. Mayor and City Council, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965) (enjoining as futile a
referendum to validate unconstitutional redistricting plan); Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civil No. 5524
(E.D. Tex. July 14, 1972) (enjoining referendum on grounds that summer date specifically was
selected to disfranchise students); Brass v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, Civil No. 17,177 (W.D.
La., Sept. 19, 1971) (enjoining election to be held under unconstitutional apportionment plan).
251. These cases are collected in M. DERFNER, THE SETTING ASIDE OF ELECTIONS OR
SHORTENING OF TERMS OF THOSE ELECTED IN INVALID ELECTIONS (Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights, Wash., D.C. 1971). Apart from redistricting cases, new election cases mentioned included:
Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969); Smith v. Paris, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967); Bell v.
Southwell, 376 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1967); Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 851 (1966); United States v. Cohan, Civil No. 2882 (S.D. Ga., Oct. 29, 1972); United
States v. Garner, 349 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Toney v. White, 348 F. Supp. 188 (W.D.
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Ordering a new election has become the most effective remedy
against voting discrimination. Elections have been set aside when the
discrimination was egregious, when the law was clear, or if neither of
these conditions applied, simply when there was discrimination that
might have affected the election's outcome. This once was called "dras-
tic, if not staggering, '"2 but the characterization was made in an early
case and no longer appears applicable. This characterization, in fact,
probably was never true, but simply reflected the fact that, until 1965,
when blacks began voting in large numbers, it would have been fruitless
to claim that a particular election had been affected by discriminating
acts and therefore should be conducted again. Such a claim is no longer
novel, and when discrimination is shown, an order to hold new elections
now seems the general rule rather than the exception.
In many situations, money damages are available for victims of
voting discrimination. Many major cases of the past, including most
white primary cases, arose as damage suits. 3 The practice of seeking
damages virtually has disappeared, but the prospect of damage judg-
ments conceivably might prevent someone from proceeding with an act
of voting discrimination.
Finally, two additional judicial doctrines have developed that tend
to increase the effectiveness of all other remedies. First, courts have
begun to award substantial attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who prevail in
voting discrimination cases. 54 Secondly, courts generally have aban-
La. 1972); Perkins v. Matthews, 336 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Patterson v. City of Belle Glade,
Civil No. 71-1686-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla., Aug. 5, 1971); United States v. Democratic Executive
Comm., Civil No. 6047-70 (S.D. Ala., Dec. 23, 1970); Ury v. Santee, 303 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill.
1969); United States v. Post, 297 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969); United States v. Democratic
Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La.
1968).
This remedy has been denied only once in a case in which discrimination was found. McGill
v. Ryals, 253 F. Supp. 374 (M.D. Ala. 1966). Post election remedies have been denied twice,
however, in cases when changes were implemented without being precleared under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the changes ultimately
were found to be discriminatory, but the Supreme Court already had held that new elections would
not be ordered because of the novelty of the Voting Rights Act issues, and in Oden v. Brittain,
Civil No. 69-433 (N.D. Ala., Feb. 2, 1970), new elections were not ordered because the change
was found by the Attorney General not to be discriminatory.
252. Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1967).
253. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) ("That private damage may be
caused by such political action, and may be recovered for in a suit at law, hardly has been doubted
for over two hundred years."); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). Even Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903),
conceded that damages were available for an illegal deprivation of the right to vote.
254. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). See other
cases collected in M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN PRO BONO Public Cases 100.01-100.16
(Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights, Wash., D.C., 1972).
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doned the traditional doctrine that the holding of an election renders
most controversies about it moot.
55
In general, therefore, the forging of effective remedies for voting
discrimination has gone far to eliminate the strange but tenacious belief
that elections are beyond judicial supervision.2 6
VI. CONCLUSION
Voting discrimination will not end soon, although it has been
curbed severely in the past few years. Moreover, the sophistication of
today's methods of securing the right to vote is no guarantee of perman-
ence. Reconstruction enfranchisement reached its high point precisely
100 years ago, yet its gains were obliterated quickly. While we are not
likely to return to an era of total disfranchisement, we will not make
lasting gains unless efforts to eliminate vote dilution persevere.257 The
right to vote cannot be protected or advanced solely in the courts;
255. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). A case still may be mooted by an election when
the controversy is not likely to arise again. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) (residence statute
changed in significant respects).
256. Unfortunately, it is still true that "over most of the United States, the conduct of
elections is the most neglected and primitive branch of our public administration." V. KEY, supra
note 43, at 443. This disgraceful condition owes its existence to the common acceptance of the
notion that a little chicanery (or a lot) keeps elections human.
257. If one branch of government plays the most critical role in guaranteeing voting rights,
it is the executive. Since the formation of the Civil Rights Section-especially since 1957-the role
of the Justice Department has been critical not only in filing cases and developing new theories,
but also in making clear that the national government is fully committed to equal voting rights.
See United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D. La. 1965)
("This is an action by the Nation against a klan.").
In addition, the Justice Department has played a critical role in supporting and protecting
private citizens from interference with their own efforts to secure the equal right to vote. The
government has acted both against official interference, United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962), and against private coercion, United States v. Beaty,
288 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1961).
Cumbersome criminal remedies are little used today, but civil remedies are available to both
the government and private citizens. The most obvious is 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1970), which
prohibits interference with a voter by anyone, whether acting under color of law or not. Section
197 1(b) applies only to federal elections, but a series of recent cases appears to have discarded, at
long last, the state action limitation on Congress' power to protect fifteenth amendment rights. In
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), 6 Justices agreed that Congress has the power
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to protect rights created by that amendment against
private intrusions. But see United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1966). Two years
later, in Jones v. Alfred I. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the
thirteenth amendment empowers Congress to legislate against private conduct that it finds consti-
tutes a "badge of slavery." This decision was reaffirmed 2 years ago when a unanimous Court held
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notwithstanding recent judicial history, courts traditionally trail, not
lead, democratic advances. In the last analysis, the equal right to vote
will be protected only if our nation believes in it.
that the thirteenth amendment authorized Congress to legislate against private conspiracies aimed
at depriving blacks of equal rights. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
This expansion bore fruit in 1968 when Congress adopted a new criminal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 245 (1970), punishing anyone-regardless of action under color of law-who uses force
or the threat of force to interfere with "any person because he is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons from voting or qualifying to
vote, qualifying or campaigning as a candidate for elective office, or qualifying or acting as a poll
watcher, or any legally authorized election official, in any primary, special, or general election
. . "' In addition, § 245 also prohibits interference with anyone aiding another person in the
exercise of these rights and prohibits interference with anyone lawfully engaged in free speech or
assembly opposing the denial of these rights.
The constitutional basis for extending § 245 to reach private conduct is set forth in S. REP.
No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted at 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1841-
43 (1968).
Section 245 is a broad statute which has not yet been used in the area of voting. One hopes
its use will not have to be extensive, but it stands both as a symbol of a national promise to achieve
the equal right to vote and as a command to enforcement officials to see that promise is honored.
